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Men’s Reproductive Rights:
A Legal History
Mary Ziegler*

Abstract
This Article offers the first legal history of men’s procreative
rights, filling a gap in scholarship on assisted reproduction, constitutional law, and social movements. A rich literature addresses
women’s procreative rights in contexts from abortion to infertility.
By comparison, we know relatively little about the history of the debate about reproductive rights for men. This void is particularly
troubling at a time when the law of reproductive rights is increasingly up for grabs, especially in the context of assisted reproduction
technologies (ART).
Men’s rights advocates—and the abortion-rights supporters responding to them—championed a jurisprudential approach to parenting that casts a long shadow today. Men’s rights advocates insisted that procreative rights should depend largely on the
individual’s reasons for wanting (or not wanting) children rather
than on sex, biology, or gestation. Abortion-rights supporters
largely countered these arguments by pointing to the emotional
challenges, physical discomfort, and medical risk associated with
pregnancy—an experience that men could not share. To resolve this
conflict, the Court struck a compromise. In cases where gestation
* Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State University College of
Law. She would like to thank Janet Dolgin, J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Deborah Forman, Dov Fox, Claire
Huntington, Jill Weber Lens, Seema Mohapatra, and Laura Rosenbury for agreeing to share comments
on their piece.
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is not a tiebreaker, judges focus on individuals’ reasons for seeking
or avoiding parenting. This compromise still influences the law of
ART and abortion.
This history helps to make sense of the dual system of reproductive rights that has emerged in recent years. While the courts adjudicate cases on abortion and assisted reproduction, these bodies of
law seem to operate largely independently from one another. This
Article offers a radically different picture of the relationship between these bodies of law, showing that they have been inextricably
linked.
This Article further exposes the dark side of individualized approaches to reproductive rights like the ones taken by courts in ART
cases. While these approaches promise to move beyond generalizations about gender, abortion foes championed such a strategy explicitly because it reinforced gender- and class-based assumptions
about what counted as a good or bad reason for seeking or avoiding
parenthood. In the abortion context, the Court should clarify the
variables (and their relative weight) relevant to balancing. In the
ART context, states should introduce legislation to encourage parties to contract meaningfully about reproduction.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article offers the first legal history of men’s procreative rights, filling a gap in scholarship on assisted reproduction, constitutional law, and social movements.1 A rich literature addresses women’s procreative rights in
contexts ranging from abortion to infertility.2 By comparison, there is relatively little scholarship about the history of the debate surrounding reproductive rights for men.3 This void is particularly troubling at a time when the law
of reproductive rights is increasingly up for grabs.4 With the spread of assisted
reproduction technologies (ART), courts and legislatures have begun to rethink when men and women have rights to seek and avoid parenthood.5
1. See Sallie Han, Making Room for Daddy: Men’s “Belly Talk” in the Contemporary United
States, in RECONCEIVING THE SECOND SEX: MEN, MASCULINITY, AND REPRODUCTION 306 (Marcia
C. Inhorn et al. eds., 2009) (“Until recently, there has been no place for men in reproduction—not in
the literature on this topic, as scholars note . . . .”); infra Parts II–IV.
2. See, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1998); CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AMERICA (2017); JOHANNA SCHOEN, ABORTION AFTER ROE (2015); MARY
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015); Linda Greenhouse &
Reva B. Siegel, Before (And After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028
(2011).
3. For a brief discussion on men’s reproduction rights in the men’s rights movement, see NANCY
LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 168–70 (1998). See also Preston D.
Mitchum, Male Reproductive Autonomy: Unplanned Fatherhood and the Victory of Child Support, 7
MOD. AM. 10 (2011) (discussing male reproductive autonomy under the Constitution); Lisa Lucile
Owens, Coerced Parenthood as Family Policy: Feminism, the Moral Agency of Women, and Men’s
“Right to Choose”, 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that unequal treatment of men and
women’s right to reproductive choices led to a “subjugation-through-rights-guarantees” phenomenon
for women); Mary A. Totz, What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander: Toward Recognition
of Men’s Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 141 (1994) (discussing reproductive rights men
may be entitled to under the Constitution). Historians and sociologists have offered more perspectives
on the movement for men’s rights after divorce. See, e.g., JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, DEFIANT
DADS: FATHERS’ RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA (2008); MICHAEL KIMMEL, ANGRY WHITE MEN:
AMERICAN MASCULINITY AT THE END OF AN ERA 135–68 (2013); MICHAEL A. MESSNER, POLITICS
OF MASCULINITIES: MEN IN MOVEMENTS 44–45 (1997); Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The
Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79 (2016).
4. Scholars have noted the various approaches courts have used to determine reproductive rights
with the spread of assisted reproductive technologies (ART). See Courtney Megan Cahill, Reproduction Reconceived, 101 MINN. L. REV. 617, 624 (2016) (“States vary significantly with respect to who
constitutes a donor or a father when individuals or couples use known or anonymous donors to conceive children through alternative reproductive means.”); infra note 5 and accompanying text.
5. See Steve P. Calandrillo & Chryssa V. Deliganis, In Vitro Fertilization and the Law: How
Legal and Regulatory Neglect Compromised a Medical Breakthrough, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 311, 329
(2015) (discussing questions that ART has left open and stating, the “law has changed far behind this
groundbreaking technology in the United States”); see also Cahill, supra note 4, 625–38 (examining
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This Article recovers an important chapter of this missing history.6 Starting in the 1970s, abortion foes tried to join a broader father’s rights movement.7 In the next several decades, the movement for men’s reproductive
rights won and lost allies, including feminists and members of the broader
men’s rights movement.8 After experimenting with several alternatives,
men’s rights advocates insisted that procreative rights should depend largely
on the individual’s reasons for wanting (or not wanting) children rather than
on sex, biology, or gestation.9 Abortion-rights supporters largely countered
these arguments by pointing to the emotional difficulty, physical discomfort,
and risk associated with pregnancy—an experience that men cannot share.10
To resolve this conflict, the U.S. Supreme Court struck a compromise: In
cases where gestation is not a tiebreaker, the legacy of the men’s rights debate
was clear. 11 In those situations, judges should focus on individuals’ reasons
for seeking or avoiding parenting, just as men’s rights proponents requested.12
This history helps to make sense of the dual system of reproductive rights
that has emerged in recent years.13 While the courts adjudicate cases on abortion and assisted reproduction, these bodies of law seem to operate largely
independently from one another.14 In the abortion context, men functionally
have no constitutional say.15 In the ART context, men and women stand on
relatively equal footing, and most courts resolve disputes by balancing the

the “reproductive binary” between women and men that drives state paternity determinations of sexual
inseminators); Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 151–56 (2017); Douglas
NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2285–316 (2017).
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Section II.B.
8. See infra Sections II.B–C.
9. See infra pp. 149–54.
10. See infra pp. 154–56.
11. See infra pp. 126, 154.
12. See infra pp. 126, 154.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See, e.g., Jean Strout, Dads and Dicta: The Values of Acknowledging Fathers’ Interests, 21
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 135, 139 (2014) (stating that the Supreme Court has emphasized that due
to the physical burden of gestation, abortion decisions are typically framed in terms of women’s
choice, and “[b]ecause men do not gestate, and thus bear no physical burden, they are excluded from
constitutional protection”).
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relative interests of the parties in making their specific reproductive decision.16 This Article offers a radically different picture of the relationship between these bodies of law, showing that they have been inextricably linked.17
The Article further exposes the dark side of individualized approaches to
reproductive rights like the ones taken by courts in ART cases.18 While these
approaches seemingly promise to move beyond generalizations about gender,
abortion foes explicitly championed the strategy because it reinforced genderand class-based assumptions about what counted as a good or bad reason for
seeking or avoiding parenthood.19 In ART cases, states should do more to
ensure that couples write their own preferences into enforceable contracts rather than allowing courts to balance parties’ interests after the fact.20 Even in
cases where balancing the parties’interests is necessary, the Court should offer
more clarity on precisely which interests judges should value and how much
weight each variable deserves.21
This Article proceeds in four parts.22 Part II explores the emergence of a
movement for men’s procreative rights in the 1970s and early 1980s, focusing
on fathers’ claims made in the contexts of abortion, sterilization, and presence
at the birth of a child.23 As this Part shows, abortion opponents initially
framed men’s procreative rights as an extension of the right to marry.24 Activists explained that giving women unilateral abortion rights increased the
odds of divorce and undermined the procreative function of marriage.25 But
by the early 1980s, as abortion opponents borrowed more from the broader
men’s rights movement that focused on rights after divorce, anti-abortion activists adopted different arguments, such as asking for formal equality between men and women when it came to procreative rights.26 Part III examines
the transformation of the movement for men’s reproductive rights in the later

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601–04 (Tenn. 1992).
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Parts II–IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
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1980s, as abortion foes focused on the rights of men regardless of marital status or conformity to conventional gender roles.27 These activists urged the
Court to focus not on the stage of pregnancy or the principle of sex equality,
but on the individual circumstances of the men and women involved in abortion cases.28 Part IV examines the legacies of this history in contemporary
abortion and ART jurisprudence, and Part V briefly concludes.29
II. FORMAL EQUALITY AND THE GESTATION DISTINCTION
Do men have reproductive rights?30 If so, how far do they reach?31 These
questions seem largely absent from constitutional jurisprudence.32 It is true
that the Supreme Court has explored the relative parental rights of men and
women inside and outside of marriage.33 Its past decisions suggest that the
Constitution protects a right to procreate,34 and precedents like Griswold v.
Connecticut,35 Eisenstadt v. Baird,36 and Roe v. Wade37 suggest that the Constitution may also a recognize a right not to procreate. But many of these
cases either ignore gender distinctions38 or focus on how reproduction is different for women.39 The reproductive rights of men have received relatively
little attention.40

27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Sections III.A–B.
29. See infra Parts IV–V.
30. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV.
637, 642–47 (1993) (discussing the traditional difference between the mother-child relationship and
the father-child relationship).
31. Id. at 647–72 (discussing the growth of paternal rights, particularly in cases of unwed fathers).
32. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 30, at 661.
34. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that “[m]arriage
and procreation” are fundamental rights).
35. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965).
36. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973).
38. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (“If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 486 (emphasizing a gender-neutral “right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights”).
39. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 139–41.
40. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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The legal history of men’s reproductive rights is similarly undeveloped.41
In recent years, historians have begun examining the fathers’ rights movement—a subject that has received relatively little attention.42 However, even
these studies focus on the rights of men after childbirth, particularly during
divorce.43
This Part begins to develop a history of men’s reproductive rights.44 As
this Part shows, abortion foes initially tried to benefit from discomfort with
the decline of traditional marriage, framing abortion as yet one more threat to
men’s traditional role as fathers and husbands.45 However, individual men
also went to court to block abortions, sometimes without the support of the
anti-abortion movement, and many of these men were unmarried, or younger
or poorer than the idealized father painted by pro-lifers.46 Abortion-rights
supporters responded partly by suggesting that the law should not reinforce a
form of traditional marriage that often harmed women.47 Increasingly, however, as feminists viewed divorce reform with more ambivalence, abortionrights supporters insisted that women should always have paramount abortion
rights because of their unique gestational capacity.48 Next, this Part examines
41. See Han, supra note 1.
42. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
43. See LEVIT, supra note 3, at 169–71 (describing the paramount concerns of the various men’s
rights groups in the 1990s were fathers’ rights upon dissolution of the marriage).
44. See infra Sections II.A–B.
45. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795–97 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting the father’s fundamental right to procreate offspring within the marriage relationship, but ultimately invalidating a state law
requiring the husband’s consent before an abortion); Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary
H.R., 94th Cong. 248–49 (1976) [hereinafter Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion] (testimony of J. Jerome Mansmann, Special Assistant Att’y Gen. of Pennsylvania); Abortion Part IV:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. 247 (1975) [hereinafter Abortion Part IV] (statement of Dennis Horan, Attorney, Americans
United for Life and Illinois Right to Life Committee); Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Dr. Eugene
Diamond and Americans United for Life, Inc., in Support of Appellees in 74-1151 and Appellants in
74-1419, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (Nos. 74-1151, 741419), 1976 WL 178721, at *104 [hereinafter Amicus Curiae of Diamond and AUL]; Two Enter Appearance for Husband, DECATUR DAILY REV., Feb. 27, 1974, at 42, https://www.newspapers.com/clip/36604422/the_decatur_daily_review/ (detailing an abortion case where a wife obtained
an abortion without the husband’s consent).
46. See Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974), and Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), for examples of these cases.
47. See, e.g., Linda Mathews, High Court to Rule on Spouse’s Rights, ANNISTON STAR, Mar. 17,
1974, at 10E.
48. See Brief for Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, a Missouri Corporation, David Hall,
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how the Supreme Court intervened in this conflict.49 In Planned Parenthood
of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the Justices struck down a spousal-consent
law, emphasizing that pregnancy served as a tiebreaker.50 Finally, this Part
examines how men’s rights activists adapted after Danforth.51 Rather than
spotlighting the importance of traditional marriage, abortion foes began maintaining that equality between the sexes required reproductive rights for some
men.52 Related arguments captured the support of some of those outside of
the abortion debate, especially when it came to child-support obligations.53
Abortion-rights supporters again stressed that equal treatment required no
such thing: men and women were not similarly situated because only women
could get pregnant.54 This argument continued to make a difference, and by
the later 1980s, even as abortion rights enjoyed less protection, pro-lifers
searched for a new way to carve out reproductive rights for men.55
A. Men’s Reproductive Rights Before Roe
Before 1965, the Court’s most famous pronouncement on the right to procreate came in a case involving a man.56 Skinner v. Oklahoma involved an
M.D., and Michael Freiman, M.D., Appellants and Cross-Appellees at 87, Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (No. 74-1151, 74-1419), 1975 WL 171451 [hereinafter
Brief for Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri] (“The wife’s claim for protection equal to that
extended to all other unwillingly pregnant women is based on her personal right to privacy in matters
relating to the protection of her physical and mental health.”); Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the
Center for Constitutional Rights and the Women’s Law Project at 7, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo.
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (No. 74-1151, 74-1419) (“The husband’s own right to procreate does
not entitle him to use an unwilling spouse's body for that purpose”); Joan Fallon, Man’s Right Pertaining to Abortion, LOWELL SUN, Jan. 2, 1974, at 2A.
49. See infra Section II.B.
50. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70–71 (1976) (“Inasmuch as it is
the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by
the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor.”).
51. See infra Section II.C.
52. See, e.g., Joan Beck, Fathers Ask for a Right in Abortion Prevention, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1977,
at 18; Blair Kamin, Dad’s Lawsuit Comes to End with Abortion, DES MOINES DAILY REG., Mar. 5,
1985, at 3A.
53. See Jack Hovelson, Action Filed; Woman Agrees to Bear Child, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 25,
1987, at 3A; David M. Margolick, An Unlikely Pair Strikes a Blow for Father’s Rights, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Nov. 9, 1981, at 7A; Frustrated Men Launch Their Own Liberation Movement, INDEP. REC.,
June 17, 1981, at 3D.
54. See infra Section II.B.
55. See infra Part III.
56. Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942).

673

[Vol. 47: 665, 2020]

Men’s Reproductive Rights
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Oklahoma law that required the sterilization of male inmates who had three
or more criminal convictions, but exempted those who had committed whitecollar crimes.57 The Skinner Court held that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause.58 “We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of
the basic civil rights of man,” the Court explained.59 “Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”60 Skinner
notwithstanding, the idea of reproductive rights was novel before the 1960s,
and even after the Court recognized such rights, the discussion most often
(and legitimately) centered on the experiences of women.61
In the early decades of the twentieth century, state law bore the influence
of the eugenics movement.62 Between 1900 and 1935, more than thirty states
required the sterilization of people deemed genetically unfit, including people
who were deemed to have questionable moral character.63 In theory, these
laws applied evenly to men and women.64 In practice, however, states disproportionately sterilized women.65 In North Carolina, a state with one of the
nation’s highest sterilization rates, women comprised 85% of those sterilized.66 Similarly, women made up the vast majority of those sterilized in
California in the first part of the twentieth century.67 This disparity was no

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 536–37.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN
HEREDITY 92–94 (1985), WENDY KLINE, BUILDING A BETTER RACE: GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND
EUGENICS FROM THE TURN OF THE CENTURY TO THE BABY BOOM 2–3 (2001), STEFAN KÜHL, THE
NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM 44–46
(1994), and MARK A. LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF COERCED STERILIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 1–4 (2008), for further discussion on the history of the eugenic legal reform
movement.
63. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Eugenic Feminism: Mental Hygiene, the Women’s Movement, and the
Campaign for Eugenic Legal Reform, 1900–1935, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 211, 212, 215–17 (2008).
64. See id. at 216–18.
65. See id.
66. See, e.g., RANDALL HANSEN & DESMOND KING, STERILIZED BY THE STATE: EUGENICS, RACE,
AND THE POPULATION SCARE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY NORTH AMERICA 242 (2013).
67. See Ziegler, supra note 63, at 216. Similarly, the proportion of state-sterilized women in California grew during the length of the program, while the proportion of affected men shrank. See Joel
T. Braslow, In the Name of Therapeutics: The Practice of Sterilization in a California State Hospital,
51 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 29, 45 (1996) (discussing sterilization rates at a single California
hospital form 1910–1950).
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surprise: many of the statutory grounds for sterilization reflected discomfort
with female sexuality outside of marriage.68
After Skinner, when the Court began recognizing the right to avoid procreation, gender played a minor role. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a Connecticut law banning the use of contraception
by married couples.69 Griswold invalidated the law, reasoning that it violated
a right to marital privacy.70 “Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred,” the
Court reasoned.71 Similarly, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court struck down a
Massachusetts contraception law, clarifying that reproductive rights belonged
to individuals rather than married couples.72 Neither Eisenstadt nor Griswold
addressed whether reproductive rights had any relationship to an individual’s
gender.73
B. Men’s Rights and the Marriage Bargain
Roe v. Wade gave the first glimpse of the relationship between gender and
reproductive rights.74 In its explanation on whether the Constitution protected
reproductive rights, the Court homed in on the detriment imposed on the
woman if denied the choice to have an abortion: the “[s]pecific and direct
harm” tied to gestation, the “[p]sychological harm,” the difficulties of child
care, and the “stigma of unwed motherhood.”75 In contrast, Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,76 declined to address whether men had any procreative rights, in the abortion context or otherwise.77 The Court noted that
none of the parties asserted any rights for men in Roe or Doe, and neither of
the challenged statutes raised the issue.78 Partly because Roe avoided the
question of men’s reproductive rights, abortion foes immediately saw fathers’
68. See id.
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 486.
72. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–55 (1972).
73. See id.; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
74. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
75. Id.
76. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973).
77. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67 (stating that neither Roe nor Doe discussed the father’s right in
the abortion decision).
78. See id.
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rights as a potentially promising path79—perhaps, the Court deliberately mentioned men’s rights to flag a willingness to uphold a related law.80
But the reasons for interest in men’s procreational rights went beyond the
language of Roe.81 Starting in the 1960s, the fathers’ rights movement
emerged, which initially challenged welfare laws that treated lovers as “substitute fathers” and participating in discussions on how to reform divorce
laws.82 By the early 1970s, when states turned away from fault requirements
for divorce, the fathers’ rights movement offered advice and new ideas on
how to change alimony, child custody, and child support laws.83 At the same
time, child-bearing patterns and preferences began to shift; while a majority
of Americans once said that a four-child family was ideal, in 1971, most preferred only a two-child family.84 As some people struggled to adapt to the
new family preferences, the fathers’ rights movement had particular resonance.85
Abortion opponents sought to benefit from these trends by bringing cases
premised on men’s reproductive rights.86 At first, pro-lifers used sympathy
for men’s rights as an argument for a constitutional amendment that would
overturn Roe.87 By the mid-1970s, an official, secular anti-abortion movement had been active for over a decade.88 Almost always with the support of
local Catholic dioceses, anti-abortion organizations had formed the decade
before to oppose laws repealing or reforming restrictions on abortion.89 These

79. See infra Section II.C.
80. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 n.67 (stating, “We need not now decide whether provisions [that
recognize the father’s right in the abortion context] are constitutional.”).
81. See Dinner, supra note 3, at 94 (discussing how early fathers’ rights activists in the 1960s
sought to restore the traditional family structure, and the socioeconomic status men derived from it).
82. See id. at 94–97.
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., George Gao, Americans’ Ideal Family Size Is Smaller than It Used to Be, PEW RES.
CTR. (May 8, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/08/ideal-size-of-the-americanfamily/ [http://pewrsr.ch/1RjXPC4].
85. See Totz, supra note 3, at 202 (discussing the impact of the women’s movement on men’s
parental rights).
86. See, e.g., Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he state contends that the
statute is necessary to protect the rights of a husband whose wife desire an abortion.”).
87. Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869, 898–903 (2014)
(discussing the constitutional amendment campaign).
88. See DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN: THE PRO-LIFE MOVEMENT BEFORE
ROE V. WADE 1–2, 6 (2016) (discussing the early years of the anti-abortion movement).
89. See, e.g., id. at 39–133.
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groups primarily presented themselves as champions of the unborn child’s
right to life.90
Before Roe, some abortion opponents had suggested that opposition to
abortion reflected the importance of reproductive rights for men as well as
women.91 However, supporters of abortion rights argued that laws like
Texas’s ban in Roe violated the rights of married men, by compromising their
happiness and ability to plan their families.92 For example, in Roe, those challenging the law included a married couple who was worried about the effect
of an unplanned pregnancy on their union.93 That couple emphasized that the
“spectre of pregnancy [was] having a divisive effect [on their] marriage,” and
on the marriages of some of the other couples challenging the law.94 For the
most part, however, those on both sides focused on the privacy rights of
women and the opposing interest of the government in protecting fetal life.95
“The right to live is more basic even than the right to procreate,” explained
Americans United for Life (AUL), a leading anti-abortion group.96
But after Roe, concerns about the rights of men took on more importance
for abortion opponents.97 Abortion foes recognized that arguments for fetal
rights had not convinced the Court or yet established adequate support for a
constitutional amendment overturning Roe—the pro-life movement’s key initiative after 1973.98 In searching for new arguments against abortion, prolifers tried to rebut arguments that compulsory pregnancies helped to damage

90. See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 87, at 899–904.
91. See, e.g., Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, supra note 45, at 65, 70 (statement of John Noonan, Professor of Law, University of California Law School at Berkeley).
92. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
93. See Brief for Appellants at 49, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18), 1971 WL
128054.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 10–57; see also Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Women’s
Organizations and Named Women in Support of Appellants in Each Case, and Brief Amici Curiae at
6–17, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40), 1972 WL 126045; Brief of Americans
United for Life, Amicus Curiae, In Support of Appellee at 4–11, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(No. 70-18), 1971 WL 128055 [hereinafter Brief of Americans United for Life]; Motion for Permission to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women’s Health and
Abortion Project, Inc., National Abortion Action Coalition at 8–60, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(Nos. 70-18, 70-40), 1971 WL 134283.
96. Brief of Americans United for Life, supra note 95, at 8.
97. See Totz, supra note 3, at 191 (discussing how the Supreme Court dealt with fathers’ rights in
a case subsequent to Roe).
98. See, e.g., Ziegler, supra note 87, at 899–904.
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nuclear families and undermine traditional marriages.99 As the divorce rate
continued to climb in the 1970s, worries about the traditional family grew
widespread.100 “By 1974, forty-five states had legislated no-fault divorce.”101
Changes to divorce laws came at a time when many families were downwardly mobile and hurt by layoffs, inflation, and a painful recession.102
Legal and economic changes convinced commentators that the family
was under fire, and abortion opponents framed the denial of men’s procreative
rights as a threat to the traditional family.103 Dennis Horan, a nationally prominent pro-life attorney who assumed AUL leadership after Roe v. Wade,
stressed that the Court’s decision in that case “provided one more wedge to
separate, undermine and ultimately destroy the nuclear family.”104 Divorce
and abortion law had encouraged people to think of families as made up of
individuals rather than members of a unit, putting the family at risk.105 Abortion opponents complained that men had “been reduced to onlooker[s].”106
Abortion opponent Carol Mansmann similarly concluded that men had lost
reproductive rights, and the family had become a collection of “fully autonomous individuals who [had] no binding relationship with each other.”107
In this account, men’s reproductive rights sprang from and reinforced the
traditional family.108 In the traditional family, by entering into marriage, men
gained the right to procreate with their wives and surrendered the right to procreate with anyone else.109 Marriage, by extension, required joint decision-

99. Cf. Brief for Appellants, supra note 93, at 49 (exemplifying an argument that an abortion statute is having an adverse impact on a traditional marriage).
100. See, e.g., ANDREW CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 45–53 (2009).
101. Dinner, supra note 3, at 103.
102. See, e.g., THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE 1970S: A NEW GLOBAL HISTORY FROM CIVIL RIGHTS
TO ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 122 (2012).
103. See, e.g., Abortion Part IV, supra note 45, at 258 (“Certainly no [one] could have anticipated
that Roe v. Wade would have such an undermining effect on relationship of parents and their children,
or one spouse to the other.”).
104. Id.; see also History, AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, https://aul.org/about/history/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2019).
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, supra note 45, at 239 (statement of Prof.
Carol Mansmann, School of Law, Duquesne University).
108. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.

678

[Vol. 47: 665, 2020]

Men’s Reproductive Rights
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

making about procreation.110 By allowing women alone to make abortion decisions, Roe deprived men of procreative autonomy inherent in the marriage
and intensified marital discord.111 Abortion opponent John Noonan argued:
“The proponents of abortion have . . . been led to challenge the structure of
the family itself . . . . The person seeking an abortion has become by federal
fiat an anonymous, rootless individual without spouse, parents, or family.”112
By appealing to tradition and history, abortion opponents also tied men’s
rights to their traditional roles as providers and sole decision makers in the
family.113 Joseph Witherspoon, a law professor and leading member of National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), argued that men had the responsibility of “bring[ing] the protection of marriage . . . to his family.”114 He argued
that the Thirteenth Amendment, a provision abolishing slavery, created the
foundation for men’s procreative rights.115 “It seems clear that there is a
strong foundation in the Thirteenth Amendment for sustaining the right of a
husband or a father of an unborn child to prevent the child’s mother from
securing an abortion,” Witherspoon testified before Congress.116 “One of the
most important purposes its framers had in mind was to bring protection to
the family relationship of those who had been or might become slaves and to
the personal rights of each member of the family.”117
Those rights, in turn, reflected men’s interest in assuming the traditional
masculine role.118 Men had rights to father children, “claim” them, and protect
and provide for them.119 Abortion denied men the right to procreate and assume their traditional role in marriage.120 “It seems perfectly clear,” With-

110. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
112. Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, supra note 45, at 70 (statement of John T.
Noonan, Jr., Professor of Law, University of California Law School at Berkeley).
113. See id. at 24–25 (statement of Joseph Witherspoon, Professor, University of Texas Law
School) (discussing how one of the purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment was to protect the integrity
of the family for those who had been slaves).
114. Id. at 25.
115. See id.
116. Abortion Part IV, supra note 45, at 531 (prepared testimony of Joseph P. Witherspoon, Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 560 (testifying that the Constitution protects a paramount civil right in the father both to
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erspoon argued, “that to subject the father of an unborn child to the uncontrolled discretion of its mother with respect to having an abortion is to convert
that father into a partial slave.”121
Abortion opponents introduced restrictions designed to protect men’s
procreative rights in marriage.122 Under Dennis Horan’s leadership, AUL attorneys helped draft laws to prevent abortions and defended such laws in
court. 123 Horan and his attorney wife, Dolores, spearheaded one such defense
in a case involving a Florida law that required a woman to have her husband’s
consent in order to obtain an abortion.124 In August 1973, the district court
overturned the law, but it appeared to suggest it would be open to a revised
version of the spousal-consent law.125 The court suggested that the government might have a compelling interest in protecting men’s reproductive
rights.126 “The biological bifurcation of the sexes, which dictates that the female alone carry the procreation of the two sexes, should not necessarily foreclose the active participation of the male in decisions relating to whether their
mutual procreation should be aborted or allowed to prosper,” the court explained.127 “The interest which a husband has in seeing his procreation carried
full term is, perhaps, at least equal to that of the mother.”128 The problem with
the law in that case was that it did not specify why men could withhold their
consent, the district court reasoned.129 And although it held that the law was
unconstitutional, the district court refused to enjoin it.130 The Horans hoped
that the Supreme Court would hear the Florida case, and that similar efforts to
secure reproductive rights for men would spread.131

conceive and raise his own child and to protect it against all who would destroy or hurt it”).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 698 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (discussing a Florida
regulation that required written parental consent, written spousal consent, or both before getting an
abortion).
123. See History, supra note 104.
124. See Two Enter Appearance, supra note 45.
125. See Coe, 376 F. Supp. at 696–97.
126. See id. at 697–98.
127. Id. at 698.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 699.
131. Abortion Part IV, supra note 45, at 248 (discussing the Horans’ anti-abortion advocacy and
efforts); Two Enter Appearance, supra note 45, at 42 (discussing the Horans’ efforts in asking the
Supreme Court to hear Coe v. Gerstein).
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While pro-life attorneys looked for test cases involving respectable, middle-class married couples, other men tried to establish what they saw as their
own reproductive rights by other means.132 In Florida, with no law backing
his claim, an unmarried man tried to stop his ex-girlfriend of six months from
terminating her pregnancy, arguing that her abortion decision violated an implicit agreement the two made by having unprotected sex.133 Similarly, in
Massachusetts, a state that did not have spousal-involvement legislation at the
time, John Doe, a twenty-seven-year old truck driver who sought to stop his
estranged wife from ending her pregnancy, took his case all the way to the
state’s highest court.134 No group backed John Doe’s case, but the Massachusetts affiliate of the National Organization for Women (NOW), a national
women’s liberation group, supported Doe’s wife.135
According to Susan Dunderson of NOW, the women’s gestational capacity should be the deciding factor in such cases.136 “It is a woman’s body, and
if she does not find a pregnancy tolerable, she should not be made to continue
it,” Dunderson explained.137 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sided
with Jane Doe.138 While recognizing that Roe had left the issue of the husband’s rights open, the court reasoned that marital privacy militated against
the court ordering a woman not to end her pregnancy, at least before fetal
viability.139 Two judges dissented, suggesting that the Constitution and common law may recognize procreative rights for men.140
How should the courts balance competing reproductive rights of men and
women in cases where gestation was not the tiebreaker?141 One of the dissenting judges in Doe proposed a strategy that would take on importance decades

132. See Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (“The primary question
presented is whether a potential putative father has the right to restrain the natural mother form terminating a pregnancy resulting from their cohabitation.”); Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974)
(discussing the right of an unwed father to enjoin his estranged girlfriend from obtaining an abortion).
133. See Jones, 278 So. 2d at 340, 342–43.
134. See Doe, 314 N.E.2d at 129, 130–31 (an example of a man trying to establish his reproductive
rights).
135. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 48.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See Doe, 314 N.E.2d at 132–33.
139. See id. at 132.
140. Id. at 133–39 (Hennessey, J., dissenting; Reardon, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 137–38 (Reardon, J., dissenting) (stating, “As in the case of the mother, the period
of gestation is for the father one of anxiety, anticipation, and growth in feeling for the unborn child,”
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later: judges should look at the individual circumstances of the parties in the
case.142 The judge noted that John Doe had offered to assume the responsibility and care of the child after birth, and to defray the medical costs of the
delivery and pregnancy.143 Whereas Jane Doe’s interests, the judge reasoned,
were temporary—avoiding the physical discomforts and health risks of pregnancy—John Doe stood to permanently lose his child.144
Still, in the aftermath of Doe v. Doe, abortion opponents mostly tried to
highlight anxiety about the transformation of traditional marriage.145
Women’s rights activists responded partly that if women were forced to seek
abortions without their husbands’ permission, a marriage might not be worth
saving.146 “[T]hat’s not an intact marriage,” said Jan Liebman of NOW about
unions where the parties disagreed about reproduction.147 “That’s a war.”148
Women’s rights groups continued to emphasize that a woman’s gestational
capacity should decide the question of who had procreative rights.149 “The
woman is the one who carries the fetus[] and gives birth to it, so she should
be the only one who decides to carry it to term,” explained Liebman.150
Nevertheless, arguments focused on the husband’s prerogatives took center stage when the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to a multi-restriction Missouri abortion statute.151 The law required doctors to have a husband’s written consent unless the woman’s life was at risk.152 Missouri
Attorney General John Danforth justified the law as an attempt to preserve
traditional marriage.153 He reasoned that to safeguard marriage, the state
and discussing the complexity of balancing competing reproductive rights where gestation does not
pose a health risk to the mother).
142. Id. (Reardon, J., dissenting) (“The balance of these two rights, each of such a sensitive and
personal nature, is, as I see it, the real task confronting the court.”).
143. See id. at 138.
144. See id. at 138–39.
145. See, e.g., Editorial, Father’s Rights Unanswered, DECATUR HERALD, Feb. 27, 1974, at 6; see
also Mary Ziegler, Abortion and the Right (Not) to Procreate, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1263, 1270–75
(2014).
146. See Mathews, supra note 47, at 10E.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 68–72 (1976).
152. See id. at 58.
153. See Brief of John C. Danforth, Attorney General of Missouri at 34–41, Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (No. 74-1151, 74-1419), 1976 WL 1787280, at *21.
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could proscribe “activities which are deleterious to marriage.”154 Guided by
its belief that marriage was an institution requiring joint decisions, Missouri
required both spouses to agree about decisions about everything from adoption and sterilization to the disposition of property.155 Allowing women to
make unilateral decisions about abortion, Missouri argued, put marriages at
risk.156
AUL filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Missouri’s law and similarly argued for government protection of traditional marriages, centered on
procreation.157 It urged that at a time when divorce was increasingly common,
the government should seek “to protect and strengthen family life.”158 As
AUL saw it, the fact that divorce had become readily accessible did not change
the government’s interest in maximizing the chances that traditional marriage
would survive.159
AUL described marriage partly as a companionate union designed for the
parties’ happiness: “The relational integrity of marriage is protected by the
mutual knowledge, consent and consultation of the parties in the important
matter of child-bearing and procreation.”160 However, AUL also stressed that
traditionally, men entered into marriage to procreate, and could see “the purpose[] and meaning of the marital relation” destroyed if a woman terminated
her pregnancy.161
AUL appealed to the Court’s interest in maintaining a traditional, procreation-centered vision of marriage, but the group also suggested that men’s
procreative rights made sense in the context of more egalitarian relationships.162 AUL started with the position that the Constitution protected men’s
as well as women’s rights to procreate.163 “The affirmative right of the male,
‘married or unmarried’, to decide to beget and raise children is hollow indeed
if the state may not, in some circumstance, act to secure his interests,” AUL

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 15.
See id. at 35–37.
See id. at 38.
See Amicus Curiae of Diamond and AUL, supra note 45, at 98–101.
Id. at 99.
See id. at 98–100.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 100.
See id. at 103–13.
See id. at 102.
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argued.164 But men’s reproductive rights did not simply arise from the tradition and history surrounding the traditional family.165 Fathers’ roles had
changed, as AUL saw it, and as a result, formally equal treatment required
recognizing abortion rights for men:
Either or both marriage partners may suffer the legal, economic, social or psychological “detriments” which, as this Court has observed,
may result from pregnancy and subsequent parenthood; either or both
may suffer social, economic, legal or psychological detriments as the
result of an abortion. Legally enforceable duties are incurred by the
husband if the child is brought to term; legally enforceable duties may
be incurred if the wife chooses to abort—for example, economic liability for the medical procedure and whatever complications which
result in the woman or subsequent children of the marriage. Here,
the joint interests and responsibilities of the parties to marriage create
obligations and liabilities in the husband. Yet, if he is denied a joint
interest in the disposition of unborn children to his marriage, he is
burdened with all the liabilities and none of the prerogatives of decisions to bring children to term or not.166
Men, as AUL put it, shared emotional bonds with their unborn children.167
Equally important, AUL suggested, men shared the financial responsibility
for raising children regardless of whether a marriage lasted.168 And as men
took on more child-care responsibilities, some men would share the day-today burden of child-rearing.169 For these married men, as AUL saw it, pregnancy, childbirth, and child-rearing created burdens similar to those experienced by their wives, and equal treatment required the recognition of reproductive rights for both men and women.170
Planned Parenthood’s supporters responded that the government could
not and should not save a form of traditional marriage that often oppressed

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
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See id.
See id.
See id.

[Vol. 47: 665, 2020]

Men’s Reproductive Rights
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

women.171 For example, in its amicus curiae brief, the Center for Constitutional Rights stressed that “the assertion of state power to guarantee the husband’s control must be viewed as insufficient, irrational and, indeed, as a reprehensible and impermissible extension of the common law subjugation of the
married woman to her husband’s will.”172 Other amicus curiae briefs insisted
that because of the woman’s role in gestating a pregnancy, any rights enjoyed
by men had to come second to a woman’s abortion decision.173 “A spouse has
no right to father children by any particular woman,” Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri reasoned.174
The Supreme Court handed down a decision in Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth in 1976, encouraging abortion opponents and
their allies to find a different way to define reproductive rights for men.175 The
Court held that Missouri could not delegate to a spouse veto power that the
state itself did not possess, at least during the first trimester of pregnancy.176
Danforth recognized that a woman’s abortion decision could jeopardize
her marriage.177 Nevertheless, as Danforth reasoned, it was “difficult to believe that the goal of fostering mutuality and trust in a marriage, and of
strengthening the marital relationship and the marriage institution, will be
achieved by giving the husband a veto power exercisable for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all.”178 When men and women disagreed, moreover,
the Court adopted the abortion-rights supporters’ position that gestation
should be the tiebreaker.179 “Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically
bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the
pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor,” Danforth
concluded.180
Danforth did not diminish abortion opponents’ interests in men’s repro-

171. See infra notes 172, 174 and accompanying text.
172. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Center for Constitutional Rights and the Women’s Law
Project, supra note 48, at 19.
173. See Brief for Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, supra note 48, at 15.
174. Id.
175. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 53, 68–71 (1976).
176. Id. at 69.
177. See id. at 70.
178. Id. at 71.
179. See id. at 70–71.
180. Id. at 71.
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ductive rights. Men continued seeking to stop women from ending their pregnancies, with many of them seeking to differentiate their cases from
Danforth.181 Increasingly, many of these men fit a profile: men who were
young, white, relatively low-income, unmarried, and uneducated, who
claimed that their girlfriends would have married and relied on them for childrearing and financial support but for the interference of the woman’s parents.182 “She has a lot to lose—a family to lose, a college education. She has
just me to gain,” explained one litigant.183
These men asserted that the Court had not fully resolved the issue of
men’s rights in Danforth.184 Some, like twenty-four-year-old James Priebe,
argued that Danforth applied only to abortions early in pregnancy; according
to Priebe, men had fundamental reproductive rights as a pregnancy progressed.185 Some of these men tried to organize; for example, in Illinois, fifty
men formed the group Fathers United Against Abortion, which brought together men who had unsuccessfully tried to stop an abortion.186 While investment in men’s rights did not diminish, the outcome of these cases seemed
similar: Danforth notwithstanding, men often succeeded in convincing trial
judges to issue restraining orders, but women often terminated their pregnancies notwithstanding any order.187
By the early 1980s, however, the arguments for men’s reproductive rights
had shifted: rather than framing men’s rights as an extension of the right to
marry, pro-life activists and their allies emphasized the importance of formally equal treatment for men’s and women’s reproduction. The next Section
turns to this debate.188

181. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 52; William Canterbury, Abortion Trial to Focus on Stage of Pregnancy, AKRON BEACON J., Sep. 15, 1977, at 13B; Boyfriend’s Plea of Father Rights Checks Abortion,
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Apr. 22, 1977, at 7B.
182. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
183. Boyfriend’s Plea of Father Rights Checks Abortion, supra note 181.
184. See supra note 181.
185. See Canterbury, supra note 181.
186. See Beck, supra note 181.
187. See, e.g., Order Too Late on Abortion, SAN MATEO TIMES, Apr. 23, 1977, at 3.
188. See infra Section II.C.
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C. Child Support, Procreation, and Formal Equality
In the early 1980s, as a nationwide recession deepened, the politics of
men’s reproductive rights again got caught up in changes to the traditional
conception of family and to family law. Divorce rates peaked at 5.3 divorces
per 1,000 people in 1981,189 and marriage rates began a steady decline.190 As
more children lived with only one parent, federal and state lawmakers stepped
up efforts to collect delinquent child support payments.191 Starting in the early
1980s, states and cities began developing more effective techniques for collecting child support, such as the garnishment of child support payments from
a man’s paycheck or federal income tax returns.192 Pressure for similar laws
seemed likely as the number of single mothers grew, especially in major urban
areas: In New York City, authorities reported that more than one in three children would be born to a single mother; nationally, the rate was one in six—
more than doubling over the course of the previous decade.193
Changing custody arrangements shaped the debate about men’s reproductive rights. In 1980, California became the first state to adopt a law allowing
for joint legal and physical custody, and other states soon followed suit.194
Legal changes suggested that after childbirth, men might have more childrearing responsibilities than had once been the case, convincing some that
men should have more control over childrearing responsibilities in the first
place.195
Cultural attitudes about fatherhood reinforced demands for new reproductive rights for men. In the early 1980s, images of fatherhood in the media
changed; sociologists and advertisers highlighted the “new father,” a man who
189. See Divorce Rate Down, But What Does It Mean?, CBS NEWS (May 11, 2007, 9:01 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/divorce-rate-down-but-what-does-it-mean/.
190. See Ana Swanson, 144 Years of Marriage and Divorce, in One Chart, WASH. POST (June 23,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/23/144-years-of-marriage-and-divorce-in-the-united-states-in-one-chart/.
191. See Dinner, supra note 3, at 135–39 (showing efforts to improve the collection of child support).
192. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mehren, Child Support Via Payroll Deduction?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1980,
at F1, https://www.newspapers.com/clip/38290220/mehren_la_times/; Burt Schorr, States Cracking
Down on Fathers Dodging Child Support Payments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1983, at 33; Child-Support
Action Prudent, ATL. J. CONST., Sep. 25, 1982, at 2B; Florida Waves Stick at Dads Who Don’t Pay
Child Support, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 6, 1985, at B2.
193. See Beck, supra note 181.
194. See Dinner, supra note 3, at 123–30.
195. Id. at 125–26.
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was present at the delivery of his children and more hands-on after birth.196
While more modest, there were also changes to the amount of childcare men
performed.197
As more men assumed childcare responsibilities, or could imagine doing
so, proponents of men’s reproductive rights described their demands in different terms. First, it made less sense to connect men’s reproductive rights to
traditional marriage when men were less likely to be or remain married. As
important, men’s rights activists increasingly took issue with what they saw
as the disconnect between reproductive rights and responsibilities.198 Some
men’s rights activists argued that if men had to support their children financially, they should have more control over when and how they had children.199
Others asserted that men who were willing to assume sole caretaking responsibility for a child should have the exclusive decision-making authority over
the child’s birth.200
Debate about child support and abortion increased the attention on reproductive rights within the fathers’ rights movement. Men’s rights activists had
long focused on the reform of divorce laws, but by the early 1980s, groups
like Men’s Equality Now International (MEN International) and the National
Congress for Men (NCM) spoke out on behalf of men seeking to block abortion.201 Formed in 1977, MEN International primarily lobbied against what
members saw as discrimination against men after divorce.202 Founded in the
early 1980s, NCM appealed to members of local and state father’s rights
groups looking for a cohesive national organization.203
Groups like NCM initially prioritized changes to divorce laws, but began
seeing men’s reproductive rights as a related issue.204 The Men’s Rights Association, a forerunner of MEN International, explained, “Without taking an
official position for or against abortion per se, we maintain that the father,
196. See STEPHANIE A. SHIELDS, SPEAKING FROM THE HEART: GENDER AND THE SOCIAL MEANING
130–35 (2002) (discussing the emergence of the “New Fatherhood” in the 1980s, where
the father took on a more nurturing role).
197. See id.
198. See supra notes 196–197 and accompanying text.
199. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 206–207 and accompanying text.
201. See infra notes 205, 207 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., JUDITH LOWDER NEWTON, FROM PANTHERS TO PROMISE KEEPERS: RETHINKING
THE MEN’S MOVEMENT 190 (2005) (discussing MEN International).
203. Id.
204. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
OF EMOTION

688

[Vol. 47: 665, 2020]

Men’s Reproductive Rights
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

married or unmarried, has an equal right to determine the fate of his offspring,
born or unborn, Supreme Court to the contrary notwithstanding.”205 NCM
took a similar stand at its 1981 Houston national conference.206 NCM contended that abortion rights “trample[d] on the legitimate rights of the fatherto-be.”207
As the fathers’ rights movement embraced men’s abortion rights, abortion
foes borrowed from increasingly visible fathers’ rights claims based on formal
equality between the sexes.208 As Deborah Dinner has shown, men’s rights
activists initially resisted child support obligations as an attack on traditional
marriage.209 But over the course of the 1980s, these advocates framed their
arguments differently, demanding sex-neutral, equal rules governing child
support and child custody—and insisting that men who had financial responsibility for their children should also have some right to custody and care of
those children.210
In the context of men’s reproductive rights, similar arguments spread in
the early 1980s in the abortion and child support contexts. One example,
which AUL was involved in, was Scheinberg v. Smith, a case involving a
Florida spousal-notification law.211 The district court had struck it down, but
the Fifth Circuit reversed, emphasizing the state’s interest in protecting the
integrity and procreative potential of marriage.212 The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that because notification involved a less onerous burden on women’s reproductive rights, the law was constitutional.213 AUL lawyers took hope from
Scheinberg that the courts might uphold spousal-notification laws.214
205. R.F. Doyle, Men’s Rights Association Philosophy, MEN’S RIGHTS ASS’N (Nov. 1, 1972),
http://www.mensdefense.org/Downloads/Archives%20of%20Mens-Fathers%20Movement.pdf.
206. See William K. Stevens, A Congress of Men Asks Equality for Both Sexes, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 1981, at B9.
207. Id.
208. See Dinner, supra note 3, at 87–121.
209. See id. at 121.
210. See id. at 87–121.
211. See Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1981).
212. See id. at 482–85.
213. See id.
214. See, e.g., Pamela Black, Abortion Affects Men, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1982, at SM76,
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/28/magazine/abortion-affects-men-too.html
[https://nyti.ms/29QAZp5] (acknowledging that AUL was “instrumental” in the court’s decision to
uphold Florida’s notification law, and quoting an AUL attorney that “their interest in the notification
requirement is . . . ‘the assumption that any kind of notification will hinder women from getting
aboritons’”); Husband Challenges Wife’s Right to Abortion, 12 OFF OUR BACKS 13 (1982),
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Often, however, men demanded rights without any statute supporting
their cause, framing their cause as an extension of formally equal treatment
for men and women. James E. Koerber, a twenty-three-year-old man from
Tennessee, insisted that sex equality required abortion rights for men.215 “I
will nurture, take care of and protect my child,” Koerber explained, in his suit
to stop his former lover’s abortion.216 Koerber emphasized that he deserved
reproductive rights because of his willingness to assume care of his child.217
In Iowa, men also made sex-equality arguments. In one case, a fathers’
rights group backed a Boonesville man who had proposed to his girlfriend
after she learned she was pregnant.218 The man emphasized that because men
had responsibilities both before and after childbirth, it was discriminatory to
deny men say over an abortion.219 A few years later, the Iowa Fathers’ Rights
Council bankrolled a similar suit.220 In both cases, the men tried to distinguish
their suits from Danforth, insisting that the Court had settled disputes only
between women and the state, and not between two private parties.221 But
these men often highlighted what they described as equality between the
sexes—arguing that men’s willingness to assume responsibilities or childsupport obligations required the recognition of equal reproductive rights.222
In the 1980s, similar arguments for men’s reproductive rights emerged
when men sought to avoid child support obligations.223 Perhaps the most
prominent of these cases involved Frank Serpico, a former New York Police
Department officer who was known for blowing the whistle on corruption in
the department.224 In the early 1980s, a flight attendant known only as “L.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25774681 (discussing AUL’s involvement in spousal-notification cases).
215. See Father, Court Stops Woman’s Abortion, PANTAGRAPH, Apr. 19, 1981, at D7, https://
www.newspapers.com/clip/38176800/james_koerber_pantagraph/ (reporting on Koerber’s suit to
stop his ex-lover’s abortion, which he stated violated their legally enforceable verbal agreement prior
to conception that he would assume “total responsibility” for any resulting pregnancies).
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See Kamin, supra note 52.
219. See id.
220. See Hovelson, supra note 53.
221. See Kamin, supra note 52; Hovelson, supra note 53.
222. See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 52.
223. Editorial, Fathers’ Rights Being Ignored, UKIAH DAILY J., Dec. 7, 1988, at 4,
https://www.newspapers.com/clip/38177605/fathers_rights_ukiah_daily_j/ (quoting a NOW official
stating that the laws were unequal in that “you can’t have a unilateral decision in the hands of the
woman and then say [the father has] got to pay child support”).
224. See Margolick, supra note 53.
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Pamela P.” established that Serpico was the father of her child and sued him
for child support.225
Serpico claimed that he had unprotected sex with L. Pamela P. only because she told him that she was taking birth control pills and could not get
pregnant.226 Strikingly, Serpico’s attorney, Karen DeCrow, was a feminist
who had formerly served as the president of NOW.227 DeCrow insisted that
sex equality required some form of reproductive rights for men.228 In her
view, the right to avoid parenthood applied equally to both men and women.229
“Just as the Supreme Court . . . said [in 1973] that women have the right to
choose whether or not to be parents, men should all have that right,” DeCrow
told the media.230
In court, men like Serpico made both state law and constitutional arguments.231 For example, Serpico maintained that under New York law, men
and women had equal financial responsibility for a child because they had an
equal say in creating the child.232 In his view, a woman who unilaterally decided to have a child should have sole financial responsibility for it.233
DeCrow also made constitutional arguments on Serpico’s behalf. She
maintained that judicial enforcement of a child support action counted as state
action for the purpose of Serpico’s argument.234 And she asserted that because
reproductive rights belonged equally to men and women, L. Pamela P. had
tried to deny Serpico’s right by lying to him about the possibility of conceiving.235
These arguments worked in the trial court, but the New York appellate
court responded that Serpico could not have constitutional interests because
he did not seek to vindicate his right to avoid procreation, but instead asked
to “have his choice regarding procreation fully respected by other individuals
225. See Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344–45 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
226. See Margolick, supra note 53.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. See Pamela P. v. Frank S., 443 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344–45 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981) (stating Serpico’s
argument that New York courts applied precepts to the father and mother’s reciprocal rights and duties).
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
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and effectuated to the extent that he should be relieved of his obligation to
support a child that he did not voluntarily choose to have.”236 Notwithstanding
the outcome of L. Pamela P., men continued to make similar arguments about
reproductive rights.237 Almost uniformly, state courts rejected these arguments, reasoning that any rights men may have did not exempt them from
child support obligations.238
L. Pamela P. and other child-support cases suggested that the politics of
men’s reproductive rights could be complex. Outside of the abortion context,
DeCrow, a feminist, thought that awarding men reproductive rights would increase the odds of men taking on more responsibility for their children and the
home. But, as Part III contends, men’s reproductive rights increasingly became identified with the abortion battle.239
III. THE BALANCING COMPROMISE
In the later 1980s, men’s reproductive rights became a central issue in the
law and politics of both abortion and assisted reproduction. This Part begins
by examining the reinvigorated campaign for men’s abortion rights in the late
1980s.240 This campaign emerged partly because of the remaking of the Supreme Court during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W.
Bush.241 Abortion opponents believed that previously futile strategies could
pay dividends with different Justices on the Court. The cultural and political
climate surrounding men’s reproductive rights had also changed. As this Part
shows, abortion foes changed their demands; rather than arguing that all men
had reproductive rights, anti-abortion attorneys asserted that reproductive authority should turn on the individual circumstances of men and women.242

236. L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. 1983).
237. See, e.g., Linda D. v. Fritz C., 687 P.2d 223. 227–28 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984).
238. See id. at 228.
239. See infra Part III.
240. See infra Section III.A.
241. For the transformation of the Supreme Court, see LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE
SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY 18–20 (1992). See also
Henry J. Reske, A Flap Over Flip-Flops, 80 A.B.A. J. 12, 12 (1994) (discussing the Justice Department’s shift during the Reagan-Bush administration that questioned the right to abortion and to overturn Roe v. Wade).
242. See infra Sections III.A–B.
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This Part next examines how these arguments failed in court, but also influenced litigation about both abortion and assisted reproduction.243
A. Contingent Reproductive Rights
When abortion foes again took up the issue of reproductive rights for men
in the late 1980s, they responded to a different political, cultural, and constitutional climate.244 The most important of these, from the standpoint of abortion opponents, was the change in the Supreme Court.245 Following the retirement of Lewis Powell, Ronald Reagan selected Anthony Kennedy as his
replacement, following the failed nomination of Robert Bork.246 Within a
matter of a few years, George H.W. Bush had selected two more nominees,
and the reconfigured Court seemed to be more promising for abortion opponents.247
The cultural climate surrounding men’s reproductive rights also seemed
different. Women’s workforce participation continued to climb over the
course of the decade, peaking in the late 1990s.248 Rates of college enrollment
increased for both men and women.249 The 1990 census showed that women
had surpassed men in choosing to enter college and achieved parity with men
in completing four years of study.250 At the start of the 1990s, the increasing
average of educational attainment carried more weight: the earnings of men

243. See infra Sections III.A–B.
244. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA, supra note 241.
245. See supra note 241 and text accompanying.
246. See EPSTEIN & KOBYLKA supra note 241, at 19.
247. See id.
248. See Lane Kenworthy & Timothy Smeeding, The United States: High and Rapidly-Rising Inequality, in CHANGING INEQUALITIES AND SOCIAL IMPACTS IN RICH COUNTRIES 695, 704 (Brian Nolan
et al. eds., 2014); POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, WHAT THE 1990 CENSUS TELLS US ABOUT
WOMEN: A STATE FACTBOOK 9 (1993) [hereinafter WHAT THE 1990 CENSUS TELL US] (discussing
the shrinking gap between men and women’s rates of college attendance); PAUL RYSCAVAGE, INCOME
INEQUALITY IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS 12–18 (1999) (discussing the increase in income
inequality and its relationship to marriage rates and college graduation); WOMEN’S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, LEAFLET NO. 90-3, FACTS ON WORKING WOMEN 1 (1990), https://ia802609.us.archive.org/18/items/ERIC_ED331992/ERIC_ED331992.pdf [hereinafter FACTS ON WORKING
WOMEN] (discussing the shrinking wage gap between men and women over the course of the 1980s).
249. See WHAT THE 1990 CENSUS TELLS US, supra note 248.
250. See id.
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and women with college degrees rose significantly, while those of men without a high-school degree began a steady decline.251 College-educated women
even began to narrow the gender wage gap.252 While marriage rates continued
to decline, women who were married and worked found themselves on the
right side of a growing economic gap.253 As the correlation between education, marriage, career, and financial well-being grew more pronounced, the
stakes of reproductive decision-making seemed different for men and women,
and the costs of unwanted or premature parenthood for women (and men)
seemed higher.
Pro-lifers adopted a strategy that reflected broader changes to the family.
James Bopp Jr., the General Counsel for NRLC, began experimenting with
men’s rights in 1988, when he represented John Smith (a pseudonym) in his
suit to block his estranged girlfriend’s abortion.254 Smith, aged twenty-four,
had started dating eighteen-year-old Jane Doe on New Year’s Eve.255 Less
than a year into their relationship, Jane Doe became pregnant.256 In some
ways, Bopp relied on the traditional narrative forged by abortion foes, casting
John Smith as a defender of a conventional family.257 Bopp and his law partner, Richard Coleson, explained that Smith, a truck driver, saw Doe as the
love of his life and wanted to marry her.258
However, Bopp and Coleson’s argument also recognized changes to the
structure of the family and the public’s attitude about it.259 As more women
251. See Kenworthy & Smeeding, supra note 248.
252. See FACTS ON WORKING WOMEN, supra note 248.
253. See RYSCAVAGE, supra note 248.
254. See James Bopp, Curriculum Vitae, POLICY EXPERTS, at 26 (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.policyexperts.org/cv/BoppJames.pdf.
255. See Abortion Dispute Sent to Indiana Lower Court, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 1988, at 3,
https://www.newspapers.com/clip/38188375/abortion_dispute_chicago_tribune/; Martha Brannigan,
Suits Argue Fathers’ Rights in Abortion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1988, at 1; Tamar Lewin, Woman Has
Abortion, Violating Court’s Order on Parental Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1988, at A26,
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/14/us/woman-has-abortion-violating-court-s-order-on-paternalrights.html [https://nyti.ms/29z7qZh].
256. See Lewin, supra note 255.
257. See In the Matter of the Unborn Child H., No. 84C01-8804-JP-185, Order (Vigo Cir. Ct. Apr.
8, 1988), rev’d sub nom. Doe v. Smith, No. 84A01-8804-CV-00112, slip op. (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 24,
1988) (on file with the author).
258. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Smith v. Doe, 492 U.S. 919 (1988) (No. 88-1837) (on file
with the author).
259. See Kenneth Jost, Do Pregnant Women Lose Legal Rights?, in 2 EDITORIAL RESEARCH
REPORTS 413–28 (1989), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1989072800, *9 (debate between the opposing counsels in Smith v. Doe on their respective arguments).
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joined the workforce or pursued a college education, it was easier for abortion
opponents to argue that unwanted parenthood would cost women vital economic opportunities.260 Bopp and Coleson factored this into their argument,
insisting that Jane Doe had “expressed no interest in further schooling or employment.”261 The two attorneys framed Jane Doe’s reasons as “frivolous,”
emphasizing her “desire . . . to look nice in a bathing suit,” her wish to preserve her existing relationship with John Smith, and her fear of childbirth.262
Even if Jane Doe, like some women, were to change her mind about childbirth,
Bopp and Coleson stressed that she could do so without impediment because
of John Smith’s willingness to care for their child.263 The two even emphasized that the stigma surrounding unwed parenthood had diminished, reducing
the social cost of having a child without marrying.264
Rather than emphasizing the importance of the traditional family or conventional gender roles, Bopp and Coleson’s new approach to men’s reproductive rights conceded the popular belief that women had sound reasons for postponing or rejecting parenthood.265 They maintained that Danforth had simply
rejected state laws awarding a veto to men and argued that the courts should
balance the reasons that each party had for making a particular procreative
choice.266 Rather than contending that men always had reproductive rights,
Bopp and Coleson asserted that reproductive rights should always depend on
an individual’s reasons for seeking or avoiding parenthood.267
Bopp and Coleson asked the family court judge to enjoin Jane Doe from
seeking an abortion, and he agreed that John Smith’s desire to become a parent
trumped any of Jane Doe’s reasons for seeking an abortion.268 While pursuing

260. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights
to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 625 (1986) (arguing against the expansion of fetal rights by warning, “Fetal rights could be used to restrict pregnant women’s autonomy in
both their personal and professional lives, in decisions ranging from nutrition to employment . . . .”).
261. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 258, at 16.
262. Id.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 17.
265. See id. at 16–17.
266. See id. at 10–13, 17.
267. See id. at 10–13.
268. See In the Matter of the Unborn Child H., No. 84C01-8804-JP-185, Order (Vigo Cir. Ct. Apr.
8, 1988), rev’d sub nom. Doe v. Smith, No. 84A01-8804-CV-00112, slip op. (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 24,
1988) (on file with the author).
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review in the Indiana Supreme Court, Jane Doe ended her pregnancy in violation of the trial court’s order, and the appellate court in Indiana reversed the
trial court’s decision.269
Bopp and Coleson’s efforts attracted media attention, and more men requested their help in bringing cases of their own.270 Bopp and Coleson assembled a how-to guide for lawyers seeking to bring cases like John Smith’s.271
“The right to an abortion is not an absolute one, and the courts have never said
that it is,” Bopp stated.272 “We’re asking the court to find that there should be
a balancing of the interests of the father against those of the mother on a caseby-case basis.”273 Some men pursued this strategy in the hope of discouraging
a woman from ending a pregnancy, making a decision more public or emotionally traumatic.274 Others recognized that proceedings could delay an abortion until more regulations kicked in or until a woman felt more reluctant to
terminate a pregnancy.275 Bopp and Coleson, however, primarily looked for
a way to chip away at Roe.
To be sure, Bopp and Coleson experimented with different arguments.
For example, when representing married men, Bopp and Coleson initially fell
back on defenses of the traditional, patriarchal family. But Bopp and Coleson
increasingly relied on an individual balancing approach, as exemplified in the
case of Erin Conn, a young father of one whose marriage was failing.276 Jennifer, Conn’s estranged wife, learned she was pregnant and wanted an abortion, and Bopp and Coleson tried to stop Jennifer from seeking an abortion.277
The two highlighted that Jennifer had not expressed interest in pursuing
education or a career.278 Conn, they suggested, would soon complete his bachelor’s degree and take on a better-paying managerial position at the toy store
that employed him, which would allow him to provide for a child and wife in
the way expected of men.279 The two attorneys cast aspersions on Jennifer’s

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
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reasons for not wanting a child, saying that she primarily wanted to stop Conn
from having custody if a child was born.280 An Indiana trial court granted an
injunction to stop Jennifer from ending her pregnancy, which she successfully
appealed before Bopp and Coleson asked the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.281
The two began by arguing that the Constitution recognized fundamental
rights for men seeking procreation, including the right to have offspring.282
Bopp and Coleson also compared Erin Conn to unwed fathers who were
awarded parental rights in the Court’s jurisprudence.283 Under the Court’s
precedents, unwed fathers gained constitutional rights by having a genetic
connection and demonstrating concrete interest in a child.284 According to
Bopp and Coleson, Erin Conn had a genetic connection and demonstrated
concrete interest when he married his wife and implicitly consented to raise
any children resulting from the marriage.285 Finally, Bopp and Coleson
claimed that Conn’s status as a father gave him the right to have children born
as the result of his marriage.286
The Supreme Court refused to hear Conn v. Conn, but Bopp and Coleson
continued taking cases, as did a network of anti-abortion lawyers across the
country.287 Bopp and Coleson modified their approach in their later cases,
especially when representing unmarried men.288 The two lawyers not only
promoted the balancing test, but also used changing attitudes and facts about
the family to their advantage.289 Bopp and Coleson suggested that at least
some men deserved reproductive rights—and at least some women functionally waived abortion rights by virtue of their reasons for making a choice:

280. See id.
281. See id. at 3–7.
282. See id. at 9–14.
283. See id. at 19.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 20.
287. See, e.g., Glen Elssaser, Court Won’t Hear Father’s Abortion Appeal, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 15,
1988), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-11-15/news/8802160348_1_abortion-decision-abortion-dispute-fetal-rights; Al Kamen, Court: Husband Can’t Veto Abortions, WASH. POST (Nov. 15,
1988), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/11/15/court-husband-cant-vet
o-abortion/a61f1003-2c64-4b1f-a728-064dc5ef675c.
288. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
289. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 258, at 6.
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Regardless of the mother’s motivation, whether it be gender selection
of her child, revenge or blackmail against the father, or some immature and near-frivolous reason—as in the case at bar—she may obtain
an abortion without any consideration of the father’s interests. It matters not what pledges she has made to him concerning the child, nor
the degree of bonding already occurring between the father and child,
nor his resources for providing for the child when born, nor the length
of time she has carried the child, nor any other reason. . . . Even in a
situation where an unborn child is the only child that the father had
ever procreated and would be able to procreate and where the interests of the mother in aborting the child are comparatively much
weaker, the Indiana appellate courts, relying on Roe and Danforth,
have declared that her right is absolute as against the father.290
While urging the Court to apply rational basis review or a less demanding
standard to abortion laws, Bopp and Coleson argued that men’s interests in
controlling reproduction became compelling under certain circumstances, especially when women did not have good reasons for wanting an abortion.291
How did abortion-rights supporters respond to Bopp and Coleson’s
claims? Jane Doe’s attorney insisted that gestation, not a woman’s reasoning
or circumstances, always served as a constitutional tiebreaker.292 The ACLU
spotlighted other problems with an individualized balancing, such as the unnecessary medical risks that delays entailed, the embarrassing trials women
were forced to go through, and the workload created for trial courts charged
with emotional, personal disputes.293 But for the most part, the ACLU focused
on gestation as a key distinction.294 The ACLU contended that because of
gestation, “every adult woman ha[d] the right to decide to have an abortion
and to effectuate that decision without government interference, regardless of
her very personal reasons and without having to reveal those reasons.”295
In the political arena, abortion-rights supporters made similar arguments.
Richard Waples, one of the attorneys defending Jane Doe, argued that men’s

290. Id.
291. See id.
292. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 4–8, Smith v. Doe, 492 U.S. 919 (1988) (No. 881837) (on file with the author).
293. See id. at 6–11.
294. Id. at 8.
295. Id.
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rights were nothing more than a sneaky way “to cut back a woman’s rights to
abortion.”296 Gloria Feldt, the new leader of Planned Parenthood, played up
the gestation distinction.297 “When [men and women] have a difference of
opinion, we must accept the reality that it is only the woman who is pregnant;
it is only her body which is at risk, and so, therefore, the woman must ultimately be able to make that decision,” Feldt said.298 Suzanne Jacobs of NOW
made the same point, suggesting that a man seeking fatherhood would “have
to find himself another incubator.”299
Arguments like Jacob’s and Feldt’s carried weight, and Bopp’s strategy
failed.300 Citing the importance of gestation in distinguishing men and
women’s positions, the Court never agreed to hear any men’s rights arguments, and pro-life lawyers eventually turned to spousal-notification laws as
an alternative.301 However, a focus on the parties’ individual circumstances—
the key move made by Bopp—lasted well beyond cases like Smith and Conn,
both inside and outside the abortion context. This Part next considers this
history.302
B. Abortion and Assisted Reproduction
In 1989, a new abortion decision changed the course of debate about abortion. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services involved a constitutional challenge to a multi-restriction Missouri law.303 None of the challenged regulations addressed men’s rights, but the Court nonetheless upheld the law in its
entirety.304 As important, a plurality of the Court seemed ready to overturn

296. Joanne Lynch, Man Loses Final Appeal to Stop Wife’s Abortion, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 22,
1988, at 2.
297. See 66 Percent in State Favor Abortion Rights, Study Finds, ARIZ. REP., Jan. 3, 1989, at B1.
298. Id.
299. Jac Wilder Versteeg, Sorry, Fathers Don’t Get a Choice, PALM BEACH POST, June 21, 1991,
at 12A.
300. See generally Barbara Ryan & Eric Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal
Notification and Marital Interaction, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 41, 41 (1989) (explaining that stakeholders in the legal community have focused attention to the issue of spousal notification laws).
301. See Conn v. Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988)
(showing how the Supreme Court refused to hear a case where the main argument against an abortion
was men’s rights).
302. See infra Section III.B.
303. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 490 (1989).
304. See id. at 504–22.
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Roe.305 In an earlier case, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Justice O’Connor had suggested that Roe’s trimester framework was
“on a collision course with itself,” and she had championed a less protective
standard, the undue-burden test.306 Four other Justices expressed skepticism
about Roe, hinting that time had shown the trimester framework to be “unsound in principle and unworkable in practice.”307 Although finding no reason
in the case at bar to overturn Roe, Webster energized abortion opponents who
were looking to more aggressively restrict abortion.308
Webster encouraged abortion foes to experiment with different tactics,
especially because the Court had not been receptive to the arguments made in
Smith and Conn.309 Nevertheless, pro-life lawyers believed that it made sense
to home in on women’s individual circumstances and reasons for terminating
a pregnancy.310 NRLC responded to Webster with a model law centered on a
woman’s reasons for having an abortion.311 The statute permitted abortion
only in cases involving rape, incest, severe fetal abnormality, and threats of
“severe and long-lasting health damage” to a woman’s health.312 Building on
the work done in cases like Smith and Conn, abortion foes argued that such a
law would enjoy public support—polls showed that Americans supported legal abortion only when women terminated pregnancies for certain reasons.313
How did abortion-rights supporters respond to Webster and the new laws
drafted in its aftermath? Most of those in groups like the National Abortion
Rights Action League (NARAL) and Planned Parenthood believed that Webster proved that the Court would inevitably overturn Roe, and hoped to benefit
305. See id.
306. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 452–75 (1983) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
307. Webster, 492 U.S. at 518 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
546 (1985)).
308. See id.
309. See id. (indicating that the Court was beginning to change its view on Roe).
310. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
311. See Paul Houston, Abortion Opponents to Press States to Legislate Wide-Ranging Curbs, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 3, 1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-10-03-mn-579-story.html.
312. Id. (discussing new legislation being drafted in Missouri and California); see also Idaho’s
Strict Abortion Bill Advances, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 1990), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm1990-03-17-mn-210-story.html; Tamar Lewin, States Testing the Limits on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 2, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/02/us/states-testing-the-limits-on-abortion.html
[https://nyti.ms/29woPiT].
313. See Houston, supra note 311; see also JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 49 (2007).
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politically from such a reversal.314 These abortion-rights supporters pointed
to post-Webster polls that suggested that the Court’s retreat from abortion
rights had not gone over well with voters.315 Leaders of groups like NARAL
and the Center for Reproductive Rights believed that the best outcome might
be a clear decision overruling Roe—a result that might help abortion-rights
supporters on election day.316 If pro-choice politicians took control of Congress and the White House, NARAL members hoped that politicians would
pass a law codifying abortion rights.317 However, when challenging individual restrictions, abortion-rights supporters focused on their impact on individual women.318
Consider the litigation of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the next abortion case that reached the Supreme Court.319 Casey involved a multi-restriction Pennsylvania law that mandated requirements
such as counseling, spousal notification, and parental involvement before a
woman could obtain an abortion.320 Feeling as though it was inevitable that
the Court would overturn Roe, Kathryn Kolbert and Linda Wharton, the lawyers challenging the law, believed that a clear decision would mobilize supporters of abortion rights, and deliver the White House and Congress into prochoice hands.321 By contrast, an ambiguous decision might gut Roe without
alerting voters to what had happened.322
Kolbert and Wharton asserted that “the ‘undue-burden’ test provide[d]
wholly inadequate protection for women seeking abortions.”323 The test—or

314. See id.
315. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 325 (2009), for the public’s
reaction to Webster.
316. See, e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 313, at 45–50.
317. See WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION WAR
222–25 (2003); Sue Thomas, NARAL PAC: Battling for Women’s Reproductive Rights, in AFTER THE
REVOLUTION: PACS, LOBBIES, AND THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESS (Robert Biersack et al. eds., 1999).
318. See infra notes 329–333 and accompanying text.
319. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
320. See Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–3220 (1990).
321. See, e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 313. at 49.
322. See id.
323. See Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 34–38, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 12006398.
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any alternative to strict scrutiny—would generate “arbitrary and discriminatory” results.324 Kolbert and Wharton expected the Court to uphold the law,
but they invested most in their challenge to the spousal-notification requirement.325 Rather than focusing on abstract constitutional harms created by the
law, Wharton and Kolbert contended that the record demonstrated that the
requirement would have “potentially disastrous consequences, including subjecting the woman to physical abuse.”326
How did the threat of domestic violence matter?327 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals had upheld most of Pennsylvania’s law, but struck down the
spousal-notification provision.328 Pennsylvania argued in its brief that the
Third Circuit had applied the wrong analysis by evaluating the effect of the
law on women harmed by it rather than the law’s impact on women across the
state.329 “To establish that a law imposes an undue burden, it surely is not
enough . . . to show that it may deter or inhibit some women from getting an
abortion.”330 Kolbert and Wharton conceded that most women in Pennsylvania were not in an abusive relationship.331 In their view, what mattered was
the effect on individual women—the threat of physical violence, retaliation
“in future child custody or divorce proceedings,” and “psychological intimidation or emotional harm.”332 Kolbert and Wharton maintained that individual circumstances should be dispositive because Fourteenth Amendment
rights were “personal ones” that did not “depend on the number of persons
who may be discriminated against.”333 The two also reiterated the importance
of gestation as a tiebreaker in the abortion context.334
324. Id. at 36.
325. See id. at 40–48.
326. Id. at 44.
327. See id. at 42.
328. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 719 (3d Cir. 1991).
329. See Brief for Respondents at 83, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(Nos. 91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 551421.
330. Id.
331. See Reply Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 15–16, Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (Nos.
91-744, 91-902), 1992 WL 551420 [hereinafter Reply Brief].
332. Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents, supra note 323, at 43.
333. Reply Brief, supra note 331, at 16 (quoting McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
235 U.S. 151, 161 (1914)).
334. Id. at 11 (arguing that the nature of the right to privacy from Roe included “personal decisions
that profoundly affect bodily integrity and destiny,” and not “a recognition of the importance of the
family”); see also Brief for Petitioner and Cross-Respondent, supra note 323, at 44 (“That decision,
however, must remain with the pregnant woman, ‘who physically bears the child and who is the more
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Casey defied the expectations of many by declining to overturn Roe’s
“essential holding” that the Constitution protected abortion.335 The decision
further solidified an emerging compromise in abortion law: Because of gestation, men would have no say in abortion; but generally, in the context of reproduction, individual circumstances made a tremendous difference.336
Like Danforth, Casey rejected a law mandating spousal involvement.337
The Court reinforced that gestation was a key distinction in the context of
abortion.338 “It is an inescapable biological fact that state regulation with respect to the child a woman is carrying will have a far greater impact on the
mother’s liberty than on the father’s,” Casey reasoned.339 “The effect of state
regulation on a woman’s protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny in
such a case, as the State has touched not only upon the private sphere of the
family but upon the very bodily integrity of the pregnant woman.”340
While reiterating the importance of gestation, Casey concluded that a
woman’s individual circumstances were constitutionally relevant.341 “The
proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant,” Casey reasoned.342
Furthermore, the Court jettisoned Roe’s trimester framework and adopted the
undue-burden standard as an alternative, making the effect of the law on individual women more constitutionally relevant.343
In the lead-up to and aftermath of Casey, the issue of men’s rights came
up in another context: the rise of assisted reproductive technology (ART).

directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976))).
335. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
336. See infra Section III.B (discussing various individual circumstances and its impact on paternal
rights).
337. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (holding that the
decision to remain pregnant is solely the woman’s choice and rejecting mandating spousal involvement); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–96.
338. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 896.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See id. at 893 (describing circumstances where it would be dangerous for a woman to have to
ask her husband for an abortion).
342. See id. at 894.
343. Id. at 877–83.
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Some techniques, like artificial insemination, had been available for centuries.344 In vitro fertilization (IVF) became more widespread by the 1990s.345
As politicians and courts hashed out what rights applied in the context of assisted reproduction, the idea of focusing on parties’ individual circumstances
soon took on outsized importance.346 And to a greater extent than many realized at the time, the histories of abortion and ART jurisprudence were inextricably linked.
These connections came into view during the litigation of the first major
embryo disposition case to capture the nation’s attention.347 During her marriage to Junior Davis, a refrigerator technician, Mary Sue, a secretary, experienced five tubal pregnancies before turning to IVF.348 Efforts to implant the
resulting pre-embryos in Mary Sue’s uterus were unsuccessful, and when the
couple’s marriage ended, the two fought about what should happen to the embryos.349 Initially, Mary Sue wanted to implant the embryos, but she openly
questioned whether she could afford to raise children or emotionally endure
the potential of losing another pregnancy.350 Junior opposed her implanting
the embryos.351
From the beginning, commentators asked whether abortion and ART law
should differ. One columnist asked whether Junior had a “greater right to
determine [what happens to] the pre-embryos than a man who has fertilized .
. . egg[s] in . . . the more traditional way”—or whether Mary Sue had a “greater
right to bear her ex-husband’s child than another divorced woman.”352 Junior

344. For a history of artificial insemination, see I. GLENN COHEN, PATIENTS WITH PASSPORTS:
MEDICAL TOURISM, LAW, AND ETHICS 378 (2015).
345. See J. BENJAMIN HURLBUT, EXPERIMENTS IN DEMOCRACY: HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH AND
THE POLITICS OF BIOETHICS 107 (2017) (discussing in vitro fertilization).
346. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992) (balancing the parties’ individual
circumstances to determine rights where gestation had begun). See generally Bruce L. Wilder, Assisted Reproduction: Preserving Families and Protecting the Rights of Individuals, 36 HUM. RTS. 21,
21–24 (2009).
347. See David Treadwell, Future Meets the Past in an Unusual Custody Battle, L.A. TIMES (Mar.
14, 1989), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-03-14-vw-704-story.html.
348. See Man in Divorce Wants to Keep Embryos Frozen, INDEX-J., Mar. 24, 1989, at 10 [hereinafter Man in Divorce]; Treadwell, supra note 347.
349. See Treadwell, supra note 347.
350. See, e.g., id.
351. See, e.g., id.
352. See Ellen Goodman, Pre-Embryos Present Custody Struggle, PALLADIUM-ITEM, Mar. 15,
1989, at A6.
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explained that he strongly opposed abortion but saw ART as different.353 “I’m
very anti-abortion. But [it is] still my right to decide whether to be a father,”
Junior said.354 And he seized on the gestation distinction central to abortion
law. “Once (a fertilized egg) is in the womb, [it] is a woman’s right,” Junior
said.355 “But this is not the woman’s womb.”356 Davis v. Davis took place not
long after the Court issued a decision in Webster.357 Mary Sue put on testimony that people bonded with pre-embryos and experienced parental emotions even in the context of a fertility clinic.358 Junior responded that allowing
Mary Sue to implant the embryos would make him feel “raped of [his] reproductive rights.”359
Aligning herself with the pro-life movement, Mary Sue took the position
that the embryos were “pre-born children” and that refusing to implant them
was murder.360 She further tried to address Junior’s arguments about the gestation distinction.361 First, she contended that as a woman, she went through
more pain as part of the IVF process and surgery than Junior.362 Her emotional
and physical investment, she explained, should give her the power to make
the decision.363 Second, she contended that in the IVF context, men gave more
informed consent to the creation of a child than they did with in vivo fertilization and should have less decisional power, not more.364 As part of her case,
Mary Sue put forth testimony from Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a prominent geneticist and veteran anti-abortion witness, to establish that life began at conception.365

353. See Man in Divorce, supra note 348.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See, e.g., French Geneticist Called for Embryo Custody Fight, REPUBLIC, Aug. 10, 1989, at
A2, https://www.newspapers.com/clip/38297577/.
358. See Husband Urges Court to Prevent Wife from Using Frozen Embryos, RENO GAZETTE-J.,
Aug. 9, 1989, at 10A.
359. Id.
360. See Mark Curriden, Plea of Divorcing Wife: Don’t ‘Murder’ Embryos By Denying Try at Life,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 9, 1989, at A6.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See Geneticist Is Expected to Be Last Witness in Embryo Case, AKRON BEACON-J., Aug. 10,
1989, at A14.
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As the judge pondered the Davis case, commentators asked how to reconcile abortion and ART cases. Abortion opponents and abortion-rights advocates were divided on the case. Some abortion-rights supporters believed
that defending Junior’s right to avoid reproduction would shore up women’s
rights to end a pregnancy.366 Others believed that awarding Junior rights
would create a precedent for giving men rights to block an abortion.367
In September 1989, the trial judge ruled that the embryos were persons
and that it was in their best interests to be implanted in Mary Sue.368 The
ruling prompted the ACLU to speak out on the case, expressing concern that
the court’s ruling conflicted with Roe.369 In 1990, the intermediate appellate
court reversed, awarding custody of the embryos to both Junior and Mary
Sue.370 By that time, Mary Sue had remarried and given up on the idea of
keeping the embryos herself, and instead requested that they be donated to
another couple.371 The court suggested that the Constitution recognized a right
to both seek and avoid procreation.372 Without much explanation, the court
reasoned that Junior’s interest in avoiding procreation trumped Mary Sue’s
interest in procreating.373 “Awarding the fertilized ova to Mary Sue for implantation against Junior’s will, in our view, constitutes impermissible state
action in violation of Junior’s constitutionally protected right not to beget a
child where no pregnancy has taken place,” the court explained.374
With the Supreme Court’s composition up for grabs, Mary Sue appealed
to the Tennessee Supreme Court and modified her arguments.375 At oral argument, both sides focused partly on the status of the pre-embryos.376 Mary
Sue’s attorney argued that in disputed cases, the tiebreaker should go to the

366. See Barbara Roessener, Abortion Battle Puts Adversaries on Equal Ground, HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 12, 1989, at B1.
367. See id.
368. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *9–11 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989)
(ruling the pre-embryos were persons at the culmination of the trial).
369. See Lacrisha Butler, Embryo Case Hits at Issue of Abortion, TENNESSEAN, Sept. 22, 1989, at
1.
370. See Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13,1990).
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. See id.
374. Id. at 2.
375. See Frozen Embryos’ Fate Left with State High Court Today, TENNESSEAN, May 9, 1991, at
4B [hereinafter Frozen Embryos’ Fate].
376. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992).
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party who was seeking to bring a life into the world.377 “When the creators . . . of potential life are unable to agree on its disposition, the creator who
seeks to protect that potential life should prevail,” her attorney asserted.378
Shortly before the Supreme Court issued a decision in Casey, the Tennessee Supreme Court handed down a ruling in Davis—one that bore the influence of the compromise forged in abortion law.379 The parties clearly had no
written contract.380 The court declined to treat the decision to use IVF as a
binding agreement.381 Nor did the court think that the state’s interest in preserving fetal life should receive serious consideration.382 Davis looked to state
statutes and to Roe, suggesting that the state’s interest in life grew as pregnancy progressed.383 Given that the pre-embryos had undergone much less
development than a fetus even earlier in pregnancy, the court reasoned that
the government had no interest that could outweigh those of individual gamete
providers.384
The court then recognized two rights at stake in the case: the right to seek
and the right to avoid procreation.385 Davis described these rights as holding
“equal significance.”386 What, then, served as a tiebreaker? The court again
fell back on gestation as a distinction.387 Indeed, the court acknowledged that
IVF demanded more of women.388 “None of the concerns about a woman’s
bodily integrity that have previously precluded men from controlling abortion
decisions [are] applicable here,” Davis explained.389 Davis boiled down the
complex logic of procreative rights in Roe and its progeny to a single idea:
“genetic parenthood.”390

377. See Frozen Embryos’ Fate, supra note 375, at 4B.
378. Id.
379. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595, 604–05.
380. See id. at 595–98.
381. See id.
382. See id. at 602–03.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id. at 601 (explaining how the right to procreate and right to avoid procreation each have
significance in this case).
386. Id.
387. See id. at 600–02.
388. See id. at 601.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 603.
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When the gestational tiebreaker was not in place, how should courts proceed? Rather than considering the right to seek or avoid procreation in the
abstract, Davis centered on each parties’ “particular circumstances, as revealed in the record.”391 In addition to the “financial and psychological consequences” of unwanted parenthood, the court emphasized Junior’s experiences of being raised in a group home, enduring estrangement from his father,
and missing additional time from his mother.392 The court further noted that
Mary Sue no longer sought to procreate at all, which made her circumstances
less compelling.393 Mary Sue’s circumstances also factored into the court’s
analysis.394 Because she could theoretically adopt or seek to become a genetic
parent through IVF, her loss of prospective parenthood was less permanent
than would be Junior’s becoming a parent against his will.395
Davis established that the compromise forged in abortion doctrine would
influence ART jurisprudence as well.396 The court reduced a series of complex questions about gender, autonomy, and the relative weight of seeking and
avoiding procreation asked in the abortion context to a single idea: gestational
parenthood.397 In abortion cases, the court suggested, the parent who gestated
a pregnancy gained the ability to make reproductive decisions. Without understanding the unintended consequences of doing so, abortion-rights supporters had urged the courts to use gestation as a reason to give women sole control over the abortion decision even when men tried to intervene.398 Although
rejecting gestation as a deciding factor, abortion foes often said less about the
importance of gestation, instead asking the courts to focus on the parties’ individual circumstances.399 Casey and other abortion cases adopted a middleground position: using gestation as a tiebreaker in the abortion context, but
also underlining the importance of individual circumstances in determining
the contours of reproductive rights.400 Part IV explores the extent to which

391. Id. at 603.
392. See id. at 603–04.
393. See id. at 604.
394. See id.
395. See id.
396. See id. at 603 (summarizing abortion law as it applies to ART in gestational parenthood).
397. See id. at 600–04.
398. See supra Part II and accompanying text.
399. See supra Part II and accompanying text.
400. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (discussing undue burden test).
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this compromise still informs the law on both abortion and ART and examines
the unexpected costs that a balancing approach has exacted.401
IV. GENERALIZING INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES
What are the legacies of this compromise in the laws of both abortion and
ART?402 This Part begins by exploring post-Davis embryo disposition
cases.403 Next, this Part evaluates the legacy of the gestation compromise in
the abortion context.404 Finally, this Part proposes ways of resolving questions
of men’s reproductive rights that go beyond the gestation distinction.405
A. The Gestation Compromise in ART
Some courts rejected the approach taken in Davis. For example, in A.Z.
v. B.Z., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the right to avoid
genetic parenthood always trumps countervailing interests.406 “[P]rior agreements to enter into familial relationships (marriage or parenthood) should not
be enforced against individuals who subsequently reconsider their decisions,”
A.Z. reasoned.407 “This enhances the ‘freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life.’”408 Three years later, the Iowa Supreme Court
likewise refused to adopt Davis’s approach.409 In In re Marriage of Witten,
the court concluded that either party could change her mind at any time about
procreation regardless of any prior agreement on the subject.410 Under Witten,
if the parties could not agree, the status quo would prevail, and neither could
use or dispose of the embryos.411
But for the most part, after Davis, courts followed a similar strategy of
enforcing a valid agreement if one could be found, and then balancing the
401. See infra Part IV.
402. See infra Section IV.A.
403. See infra Section IV.A.
404. See infra Section IV.B.
405. See infra Part IV.C.
406. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058–59 (Mass. 2000).
407. Id. at 1059.
408. Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
V. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974))).
409. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
410. See id. at 775–84.
411. Id. at 778.
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parties’ individual circumstances when it was hard to identify an adequate
agreement. In J.B. v. M.B., for example, a woman sought to have pre-embryos
destroyed while her estranged husband asked that the embryos be donated or
implanted.412 Although the parties had signed a consent form before beginning IVF, the court found that it evinced no clear intent about what should
happen to the embryos in the event of divorce.413 The court then balanced the
parties’ individualized circumstances, emphasizing that M.B. already had
children and that there were no signs that he was infertile or unable to have
more.414 Although J.B. suggested that the right to avoid procreation usually
carries more weight, J.B.’s personal situation heavily influenced the court’s
decision.415
A similar scenario arose in Reber v. Reiss.416 In that case, the court also
found no enforceable agreement and balanced the parties’ competing interests.417 The court stressed that the woman seeking procreation was over forty
and had undergone chemotherapy for breast cancer, making it likely that she
could only achieve genetic parenthood through the implantation of the disputed embryos.418 The court emphasized the woman’s desire to experience
pregnancy.419 Moreover, as the court saw it, her past health troubles and age
made it less likely that she could successfully adopt a child.420 For his part,
her former partner resented the idea of a genetic child growing up without him
and did not want the financial responsibility that would accompany the birth
of a child.421 The court downplayed these concerns, emphasizing that the
man’s wife would allow him to have a relationship with his child if he wished,
and ruled that the woman was allowed to implant the embryos if she wished.422
The unpredictability of the balancing test was on display again in Szafranski v. Dunston.423 In that case, an unmarried man sought to stop his ex-

412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
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See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 710 (N.J. 2001).
See id. at 713.
See id. at 716–17.
See id.
See Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. 2012).
See id. at 1136.
See id. at 1138–40.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1140–42.
See id.
See Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, 34 N.E.3d 1132.
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girlfriend from implanting embryos against his will.424 The court found no
enforceable agreement and turned to the parties’ individual interests.425 Karla,
the woman, had suffered ovarian failure as the result of chemotherapy, and
she desperately wanted a genetic child who might remind her of her father,
who died when she was five years old.426 Jacob, by contrast, cited his loss of
a love interest, the stigma he felt in fathering a child he did not love, and the
difficulty he would have in attracting a future partner.427 While recognizing
the potential costs of unwanted genetic parenthood, the court stressed that Jacob might have no trouble attracting a partner, and thus concluded that Karla’s
interests should prevail.428
What could be wrong with paying so much attention to the parties’ individual circumstances? The history of efforts to determine reproductive rights
by looking at the parties’ individual circumstances offers reason for caution.
Abortion foes turned to a balancing strategy partly because they believed that
judges would denigrate certain reasons for seeking (or avoiding) parenthood.
While a judge may sympathize with a woman’s desire to pursue an education
or a career, for example, pro-life attorneys bet that women seeking a clean
break with an ex-lover or women afraid of the pain of childbirth would receive
a more negative response.429 These attorneys played to mainstream generalizations about what the family should look like and what counted as a good
enough reason to swear off a traditional relationship.430
In the ART context today, focusing on individual circumstances can create similar problems. In Szafranski, for example, the court attached far less
significance to a man’s concern about his ability to find a romantic partner
than it did a woman’s desire to bear a child who was genetically related to
her.431 While the number of people without children has declined in recent
years, the percentage of those who voluntarily remain childfree has increased.432 Decisions like Szafranski disproportionately affect those who do

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.

See id. ¶ 2.
See id. ¶ 5.
See id. ¶ 8.
See id. ¶ 22.
See id. ¶ 5.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶¶ 124–32, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1162–63.
See, e.g., Joseph Chamie & Barry Mirkin, Childless by Choice, YALE U.: YALEGLOBAL
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not wish to have children or view their ability to find or keep a romantic partner as more important.
Courts also tend to assume that the emotional payoff of procreation depends on the number of children a person already has—a conclusion that penalizes the increasingly small number of people with large families.433 African-Americans and Latinos are far more likely to have large families than are
those of other races: according to recent Pew Research Center data, significantly more African-Americans and Latinos had three or four or more children
than did parents in other groups.434 By suggesting that the decision to become
a genetic parent carries more weight than does the decision to have an additional genetic child, courts tend to advantage those in racial groups that conform to the trend of shrinking family size.435
Courts also make assumptions about a party’s ability to have future children through IVF or adoption that may be unrealistic for many people with
reduced financial means.436 In 2018, the average IVF cycle cost $12,000, not
including fertility drugs, which can add an extra $3,000 to $5,000.437 Many
patients report spending more than $60,000 on IVF, and states often provide
incomplete insurance coverage or none at all.438 Even middle-class couples
and individuals routinely take out private loans, loans against their retirement
funds, or drain their savings accounts.439 For low-income consumers, IVF will
often be financially out of reach.
And courts have been more convinced that unwanted genetic parenthood

ONLINE (Mar. 2, 2012), https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/childless-choice; see also Claire Cain Miller, The U.S. Fertility Rate Is Down, Yet More Women Are Mothers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/upshot/the-us-fertility-rate-is-down-yet-more-women-aremothers.html [https://nyti.ms/2FRAQxC] (discussing the decrease in the number of women who had
no children by forty-five).
433. See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 716–17 (N.J. 2001); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1140–
42 (Pa. 2012).
434. GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON, PEW RES. CTR., CHILDLESSNESS FALLS, FAMILY SIZE GROWS
AMONG HIGHLY EDUCATED WOMEN 10 (2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/05/2015-05-07_children-ever-born_FINAL.pdf.
435. See, e.g., J.B., 783 A.2d at 717 (“M.B.’s right to procreate is not lost if he is denied an opportunity to use or donate the pre-embryos. M.B. is already a father and is able to become a father to
additional children, whether through natural procreation or further in vitro fertilization.”).
436. See, e.g., id. at 716–17; Reber, 42 A.3d at 1140–42.
437. See Nina Bahadur, The Cost of Infertility, SELF (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.self.com/story/thecost-of-infertility.
438. See, e.g., id.
439. See id.
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will be traumatic when a party can point to childhood experiences of divorce
or abandonment, undervaluing the potential harms suffered by people who
have different reasons for refusing or postponing genetic parenthood.440 Surveys of millennials, for example, show that some wish not to have children
because of the feared impact of overpopulation and the strain more people put
on the environment.441 Others report their lacking maternal or paternal instincts.442 Still others wish to prioritize their careers or lead a lifestyle that
seems incompatible with children.443 Some have no clearly articulable reason
beyond simply wanting to remain childfree.444 Courts have shown sympathy
to parties who have had traumatic childhoods and who, as a result, wish to
avoid parenthood or to have a genetic child raised in a certain setting.445 However, in the ART setting, parties have a harder time justifying their wish not
to become genetic parents.446
Moreover, it is hard to reconcile the idea of forcing someone to justify a
decision to seek or avoid procreation with the idea that one has a right to do
either one. To the extent that the Constitution protects a right to seek or avoid
procreation, a person may have deeply personal, even idiosyncratic reasons
for making a choice.447 The Court has suggested that reproductive decisions
enjoy protection regardless of a person’s reasons for choosing a certain option.448 Conditioning the availability of a right on the existence of an appealing story undermines the very idea that the Constitution protects reproductive
liberty.

440. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992).
441. See, e.g., Nicolas DiDomizio, 11 Brutally Honest Reasons Millennials Don’t Want Kids, MIC
(July 30, 2015), https://mic.com/articles/123051/why-millennials-dont-want-kids#.A5Y4CQqMF;
Jillian Kramer, One-Third of Millennials Don’t Want Kids, GLAMOUR (Oct. 22, 2015),
https://www.glamour.com/story/millennials-dont-want-kids.
442. See DiDimozio, supra note 441.
443. See id.
444. See id.
445. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603–04 (holding that appellants’ “severe problems caused by separation from parents” outweighed appellees’ interest in donating embryos).
446. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶¶ 126–32, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1161–
63 (holding that a man’s loss of love interest, interest in not wanting the stigma of fathering a child he
did not love, and difficulty in finding a future partner were outweighed by the woman’s interest in
implanting embryos).
447. See DiDimozio, supra note 441.
448. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (“The destiny of
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and
her place in society.”).
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Abortion opponents fully understood the tension between an individualized balancing approach and the recognition of a fundamental right to abortion.449 By suggesting that some women did not have a good enough reason
to make an abortion decision, abortion foes hoped to establish that women had
no right to terminate a pregnancy.450 And pro-lifers hoped that if some men
could tell a moving story, then the courts would recognize a compelling interest that would trump any abortion right women retained.451
A similar issue exists in the ART context.452 What does it mean to have
a right to avoid genetic parenthood if that right depends on a person’s reasons
for making a choice? As technologies evolve, the dimensions of reproductive
rights have been increasingly uncertain. Balancing analyses send a contradictory message about what rights anyone has when it comes to genetic
parenthood.
Focusing on individual circumstances also tends to create bad law. In
cases like Smith and Conn, abortion opponents hoped that courts would generalize about men’s reproductive rights based on the compelling story of a
single litigant.453 For example, in Smith, Smith’s attorneys pointed to Jane
Doe’s interest in her appearance and her intimate relationship to establish that
some women (and perhaps many women) lacked a justification for ending a
pregnancy.454
Courts in contemporary ART cases have similarly drawn broad conclusions based partly on the facts of individual cases. In Davis, for example, the
court paid considerable attention to Junior’s extremely painful childhood and
the fact that Mary Sue no longer wanted to implant the embryos herself.455
Then, with little explanation, the court held that the right to avoid procreation
usually trumps the right to seek it.456 This may well be the right conclusion,
449. See supra Part III.
450. See supra Part III.
451. See supra Part III.
452. See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603–04 (Tenn. 1992) (weighing the husband’s
interest in not having children raised in a one parent home because of his past traumatic childhood
experience with the divorce of his parents as greater than the wife’s interests in donating the embryos).
But see Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶¶ 126–32, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1161–63
(weighing the husband’s interest in future romantic relationships as less than the wife’s interest in
having children).
453. See supra Section III.A.
454. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 258, at 16.
455. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 600–04.
456. See id.
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but it is far from obvious, and Davis at most suggested that the right to avoid
procreation was weightier because any violation of it would be permanent
(whereas a party seeking children could theoretically have them in other
ways).457 But Davis did not do much to theorize the harms of having an unwanted genetic child in the world—a task with which courts have struggled
with other contexts, such as tort cases for wrongful birth and wrongful life, in
which judges have had a notoriously hard time pinpointing how (and how
badly) a party is injured by the birth of a genetically related child.458
Consider the question of damages. Courts are most willing to recognize
a tort for wrongful birth when a parent can show unique medical expenses that
accompany the birth of a child with unusual needs.459 But in the context of
wrongful birth or wrongful life, courts have had a harder time explaining the
harm suffered by a healthy (but unplanned) child by virtue of being born or
the injuries suffered by someone who does not want to become a parent.460
Dov Fox has convincingly shown that the difficulty of putting a number on
these injuries does not make them any less real or worthy of recognition.461
But the laws of wrongful birth and wrongful life show that courts have their
work cut out for them in theorizing the harms inherent in unwanted genetic
parenthood (or an unfulfilled desire for genetic parenthood).462 Starting from
the facts of the individual cases tends to blind the courts to the many key
questions that should be answered rather than pointing the way to a better

457. See id.
458. See id. For more on the challenges that courts have faced in addressing wrongful life and
wrongful birth cases, see Alan B. Handler, Individual Worth, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 493, 500 (1989),
which notes that all jurisdictions faced with wrongful birth and/or wrongful life claims “have struggled
mightily with its perplexing legal and moral issues.” See also Wendy Hensel, The Disabling Impact
of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 144 (2005); Michael
B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in “Wrongful Life” Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 507–08, 589
(1991).
459. See Daniel W. Whitney & Kenneth N. Rosenbaum, Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Birth,
32 J. LEGAL MED. 167, 190–97 (2011) (summarizing the majority rule among courts that recognize
wrongful birth that the action permits, at a minimum, damages measured by the extraordinary cost, at
least through minority, of supporting the child with severe birth defects) (quotation omitted).
460. See Michael T. Murtaugh, Wrongful Birth: The Courts’ Dilemma in Determining a Remedy
for a “Blessed Event,” 27 PACE L. REV. 241, 248 (2007) (stating that in wrongful birth causes of
action, courts have focused on the health of the unplanned child to determine the extent of the parents’
injury).
461. See Fox, supra note 5, at 224.
462. Id. at 211–13 (explaining the many considerations and benefits of more regulatory oversight
of procreation rights).
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answer.463
In generalizing from the parties’ individual circumstances, courts consistently grapple with the specific harms of having an unwanted genetic child (or
the harms of being unable to have a wanted genetic child).464 In defining the
rights of unwed fathers, the Supreme Court has at times said that a genetic
connection matters because it creates an opportunity for parents to bond with
their children.465 But the importance of genetic parenthood remains poorly
explained, especially as genetic science advances.466 Does genetic parenthood
matter because of the cultural expectations many hold about the connection
someone shares with genetic parents? Or because of medical, personal, or
cultural information known to a genetic parent? Or because of a person’s
ambivalence about parenting? Because, as in Junior Davis’s case, a party has
strong preferences about how a genetic child is raised? The contours and
power of a fundamental right could differ significantly depending on the answers to these questions.
And what about the right to seek genetic parenthood? In generalizing
from the stories of a specific party, the courts have sometimes suggested that
there is a right to seek genetic parenthood as opposed to some other kind of
parental relationship. There is no doubt that genetic parenthood is unique, just
as adoptive parenthood is unique. It is less obvious why one form of
parenthood should be more valued than others. The answer to this question
requires full briefing and argument, not a simple extrapolation from the facts
of a specific case.
Moreover, the unpredictability involved in individualized balancing can
have the kind of chilling effect sought out by abortion opponents in the
1980s.467 Without knowing in advance how moving a judge will find a person’s story, a party will feel far from confident that she will have a right to
seek or avoid procreation. This uncertainty is more troubling in the context

463. See id. at 153–57 (explaining the types of cases courts have attempted to handle and the pitfalls
of an individualized case approach).
464. Id. at 159–61 (describing the author’s proposal for court treatment of parents’ inability to reproduce with specific genetic traits).
465. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
466. See Fox, supra note 5, at 160; see also Robert VerBruggen, The Genetics of Parenting, INS.
FOR FAM. STUD. (July 25, 2018), https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-genetics-of-parenting (summarizing recent studies researching the impact of genetic connection on parent and child interactions).
467. See supra Section III.B.
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of ART. When using ART, parties account for the uncertainty that a pregnancy will come to term. Nevertheless, ART holds out the promise of increased legal or practical control for those who use it. An unpredictable balancing standard undermines these expectations.
The history of the gestation compromise should give pause to those happy
with a balancing approach. To be sure, gestation matters. Pregnancy is a
unique experience for women that carries its own psychological and physical
risks. But in the 1980s, as Roe seemed increasingly under threat, abortionrights supporters used gestation as a way out of a more complicated conversation about why women should have abortion rights. While trying to move
beyond the gestation distinction, abortion opponents proposed an alternative
distinction: the individuals’ reasons for making a reproductive decision. The
Court struck a compromise between the two, treating gestation as decisive in
the abortion context but suggesting that individual circumstances generally
took on paramount importance.
The difficulties with pregnancy and childbirth always did—and should—
play a role in the debate about abortion rights.468 Pregnancy and childbirth
remain more dangerous for women in the United States than for those in other
countries.469 The threat of harm to women of color is even higher.470 And the
laws protecting against pregnancy discrimination still has real gaps in the protection it provides.471 In 2015, the Supreme Court made it easier for women
to challenge accommodation policies that systematically disadvantage pregnant women.472 But the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act still does not
require employers to accommodate pregnant women in any way.473 Pregnancy carries career risks as well as the possibility of physical injury.
But before and after the 1980s, the reasons for recognizing abortion rights

468. See, e.g., Kate Womersley, Why Giving Birth Is Safer in Britain Than in the U.S., PROPUBLICA
(Aug. 31, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-giving-birth-is-safer-in-britainthan-in-the-u-s.
469. See id.
470. See Nina Martin & Renee Montagne, Nothing Protects Black Women from Dying in Pregnancy
and Childbirth, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/nothingprotects-black-women-from-dying-in-pregnancy-and-childbirth.
471. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978).
472. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1343–44 (2015) (requiring courts to
consider the extent to which an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than it treats
non-pregnant workers).
473. See id. at 1349–50 (holding only that employers cannot deny pregnant workers accommodations that are being offered to other workers who have a similar inability to work).
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went well beyond bodily integrity. Some of those reasons involved potential
problems with the justifications for abortion laws, including those that may
have been based on sex stereotypes or on religious beliefs.474 Reva Siegel and
other scholars have studied the extent to which assumptions about motherhood animate abortion regulations.475 Moreover, while the Supreme Court has
rejected challenges to abortion regulations under the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, arguments linking religion to prolife sentiment have taken on new importance.476 In recent years, women have
looked to state equivalents of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in asserting that abortion laws infringe on their own deeply held faith-based convictions.477 By focusing so much on gestation, abortion-rights supporters inadvertently helped to obscure how these important considerations influenced
the debate on men’s reproductive rights.
The emphasis on gestation also draws attention away from the post-pregnancy consequences of carrying a child to term, for both men and women. At
a minimum, carrying a pregnancy to term would involve unwanted genetic
parenthood for a man, a woman, or both. And for many women, given the
frequency of single-parent homes and the share of childcare performed by
women, giving birth to a child will entail child-rearing commitments.478
These consequences fall unevenly on Americans of different races and educational backgrounds.479 Even among those in two-parent households, research

474. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation
and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); see also Courtney Megan Cahill,
Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 410–16 (2013); Reva B. Siegel, The New
Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 991, 999 (2007).
475. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955 (1984).
476. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318–22 (1980) (showing the Court’s skepticism of religion-based arguments).
477. See Cristina Maza, Satanic Temple Says Abortion Laws Violate Its Religious Rights by Promoting Christian Beliefs, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 23, 2018, 11:51 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/satanictemple-says-abortion-laws-violate-its-religious-rights-promoting-788269; Mary Papenfuss, Satanic
Temple Religious Challenge to Missouri Abortion Law Heads to Court, HUFFPOST (Jan. 22, 2018,
11:47 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/satanic-temple-missouri-abortionchallenge_us_5a6674b3e4b0e5630072cdc7.
478. See Maria Cohut, Women ‘Spend More Time on Housework, Childcare Than Men,’ MED.
NEWS TODAY (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/319687.php.
479. See Elizabeth Wildsmith et al., Dramatic Increase in Proportion of Births Outside of Marriage
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suggests that women still perform more childcare than men.480 During the
1970s and 1980s, those on both sides of the abortion debate asked important
questions about the extent to which reproductive decisions should have any
relationship to subsequent childrearing duties, but because the courts adopted
the gestation distinction, these questions largely remained unanswered.481 The
relationship between childbirth and subsequent childcare responsibilities deserves more exploration.
And conversations about men’s reproductive rights went beyond the abortion context—addressing whether child support obligations should carry any
related rights, whether child-rearing tasks should match authority to make reproductive decisions, whether men’s interest in having a genetic child (or a
genetic child within marriage, or with a specific woman) should be constitutionally significant.482 For the most part, case law on these subjects seems
distinct and unrelated. In the abortion context, disputes between men and
women came down to women’s gestational capacity.483 In child support cases,
courts often looked at the statutory purpose of child support laws and the lack
of state action undermining any constitutional protection.484 For some litigants, this failure to harmonize related bodies of law creates a sense that the
law is incoherent or unjust.
Often, abortion-rights supporters navigated these complicated questions
by directing attention to the simplest distinction between men and women:
gestation.485 This strategy had obvious advantages. Gestation obviously differentiates men and women. The difference in gestational capacity does not
require thoughtful analysis or open the door to unpredictable results. And the
gestation distinction seemed likely to shore up abortion rights: whenever there
was a conflict between men and women, women’s gestational capacity meant

in the United States from 1990 to 2016, CHILD TRENDS (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.childtrends.org/publications/dramatic-increase-in-percentage-of-births-outside-marriage-among-whiteshispanics-and-women-with-higher-education-levels.
480. See Cohut, supra note 478.
481. See supra Sections III.B–C (discussing the history of the questions asked by each side of the
abortion debate that were not given answers).
482. See supra Section II.C.
483. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 53, 71 (1976).
484. See L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 716 (N.Y. 1983).
485. See supra text accompanying note 48 (describing the preference for women’s rights due to
gestational capacity).
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that abortion rights would be safe.486 But the court increasingly viewed reproductive rights, but for the fact of gestation, as a matter of individual motives
and circumstances.487 This move has made ART jurisprudence less principled, less transparent, and less well-explained than it ought to have been.488
What legacy has the gestation compromise had in abortion law? Most
obviously, the Court has struck down spousal-involvement laws, while performing an individualized balancing in other contexts.489 To be sure, balancing to some extent reflects the Court’s approach to abortion.490 Because Casey
treats the government’s interest in protecting life as important, the Court gives
weight to both women’s reproductive liberty and the government’s interest in
fetal life.491 However, the nature of this balancing test—and the Court’s factintensive, individualized, case-by-case focus—has created problems, many of
them connected to the original gestation compromise.492 The next section
studies these issues.493
B. Individualized Balancing and Abortion
In Casey and a subsequent decision, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, in 2016, the Court has evaluated abortion regulations by looking at their
impact on individual women.494 Abortion and ART law are certainly different
in salient ways. In ART cases, courts tend to balance the constitutional interests of specific men and women making reproductive decisions.495 By contrast, for the most part, in abortion cases, the Court balances the government’s
interests against the burden a law places on specific individuals.496 But the
costs of individualized balancing are similar across either domain.

486. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
487. See supra Part III.
488. See supra notes 425–428, 432 and accompanying text.
489. See supra Section III.B.
490. See infra Section IV.B.
491. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–18 (2016); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877–902 (1992).
492. See infra Section IV.B (explaining the balance between men and women’s rights with regard
to abortion).
493. See infra Section IV.B.
494. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.
495. Id.; see supra Part III.B (discussing abortion and assisted reproduction).
496. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
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Casey and its progeny emphasized that abortion rights belong to individual women—and depend on their specific circumstances.497 This conclusion
has spawned ongoing uncertainty about precisely what is being balanced—or
what weight should be attached to specific variables.498 Ever since Casey
came down, for example, the lower courts have battled about how many
women a law must affect before a law is unduly burdensome.499 Casey
seemed to answer this question: the relevant group was those “for whom the
law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”500
But the Court’s decision left many questions unanswered. Consider the
debate that preceded Whole Woman’s Health.501 That case concerned two
Texas laws.502 One required a doctor performing abortions to have admitting
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles.503 A second mandated that abortion
clinics comply with the regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers.504
The parties agreed that if the law went into effect that all but a handful of
clinics would close.505 Texas argued that the best way to measure a burden
was to look at the number of women affected in the entire state.506 Those
challenging the law insisted that the relevant group was women who did not
live near one of the remaining clinics.507
Whole Woman’s Health repeated Casey’s conclusion that judges should
ask whether a law mattered to “a large fraction of cases in which [the provision
at issue] is relevant.”508 What did this mean? Whole Woman’s Health stated
that this group was a “class narrower than ‘all women,’ ‘pregnant women,’ or
497. See id. at 875–78.
498. See Leah Libresco, The Supreme Court’s Test for Abortion Laws Is a Poorly Defined Math
Problem, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 3, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-supreme-courtstest-for-abortion-laws-is-a-poorly-defined-math-problem/ (parsing the variables at play in abortion debates).
499. See id.
500. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
501. See generally Due Process Clause—Undue Burden: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
130 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2016).
502. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
503. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2015), invalidated
by Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
504. See id. § 245.010(a), invalidated by Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292.
505. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2301–04.
506. See, e.g., Libresco, supra note 498.
507. See id.
508. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2320 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)).
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even ‘the class of women seeking abortions identified by the State.’”509 But
the meaning of this large fraction remains up for grabs. Writing in dissent,
Justice Alito suggested that if a law impacted any women, it would satisfy
Whole Woman’s Health’s definition of a large fraction.510 Is Alito correct?
And what must be shown to demonstrate that a large fraction of individual
women face a burden? In Planned Parenthood of Arkansas & Eastern Oklahoma v. Jegley, the Eighth Circuit considered a law requiring, among other
things, that doctors performing medication abortions have hospital admitting
privileges and a contract with a physician who could help in cases of medical
emergencies.511 Relying on Whole Woman’s Health, the district court had
enjoined the law, concluding that it was likely unconstitutional.512 The Eighth
Circuit reversed, suggesting that the district court had not made adequate findings about the number of women affected.513 What number counts as a large
fraction? How much proof must those challenging a regulation have to show
that they have done the math correctly? Casey’s individualized balancing invites this kind of uncertainty.
Casey’s individualized balancing also has created confusion about what
judges should weigh and how important each variable is. In Whole Woman’s
Health, the Court found that Texas’s HB2 delivered no benefits while creating
a significant burden.514 But what should happen if a law does have a benefit
but is significantly burdensome? Or how should courts evaluate a law that
has no benefit but is only minimally burdensome? And does the balancing
analysis detailed in Whole Woman’s Health apply to all abortion regulations,
or only a subset, such as those involving statutes claimed to protect women’s
health?
Nor has the Court clarified whether the individualized impact of a law
should include consideration of how a woman experiences a particular regulation in isolation versus as part of an overarching statutory scheme. Whole
Woman’s Health suggested that the latter was true: the Court evaluated the
combined effect of both challenged parts of HB2.515 But does this approach
509. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895).
510. See id. at 2342–42 (Alito, J., dissenting).
511. See 864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2017).
512. See Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley, No. 4:15-cv-00784-KGB, 2016 WL
6211310, *10–32 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 4, 2016).
513. See Jegley, 864 F.3d at 957–60.
514. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–17.
515. See id.
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extend only to regulations challenged in a given case? Or does it make more
sense to consider all abortion restrictions on the books in a state or even all
laws that impact abortion access, such as laws regulating the disposal of fetal
remains?
C. Alternatives
What alternative to individualized balancing should the courts adopt? In
embryo-disposition cases, courts already prefer to honor contracts or informed-consent agreements detailing what should happen in the event of a
separation or divorce.516 To be sure, some have expressed skepticism about a
contract-based approach, suggesting that it may be unconstitutional or at least
unwise to bind someone to a past reproductive decision even after she changes
her mind.517 This is a valid concern, but for some time, the law has bound
people to past reproductive decisions. After the point of fetal viability, for
example, a woman may no longer terminate a pregnancy regardless of her
current views on the matter.518 In the context of in vivo reproduction, men
have a right to access contraception but cannot force a woman to end or continue a pregnancy.519 In general, the Court has suggested that reproductive
rights require an ability to make informed decisions, not the power to change
one’s mind at any time for any reason.520
And alternatives, like the mutual contemporaneous consent approach outlined in In re Marriage of Witten, create problems of their own.521 Witten
functionally allows the party who favors the status quo to prevail.522 Signifi-

516. See Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶ 117, 34 N.E.3d 1142, 1157–58 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2015).
517. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 595 (Colo. 2018); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 598–605 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998); In re Marriage of Dahl,
194 P.3d 834, 840 (Or. Ct. App. 2009); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40, 53–55 (Tex. App. 2006).
518. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877–82 (1992).
519. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (“The obvious facts
is that when the wife and husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage
partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more
directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her
favor.”).
520. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–82.
521. See In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 775–84 (Iowa 2003).
522. See id.
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cantly, when a couple is divorcing or separating, Witten could allow one partner to effectively hold embryos hostage in exchange for a more favorable financial settlement.523 At the point that a relationship is ending, a partner might
be inclined to punish an ex regardless of her views about reproduction.524
A contract-based approach could encourage people to make more
thoughtful decisions about genetic parenthood.525 States should pass laws
governing the formation and enforcement of embryo disposition agreements.
In other ART contexts, state laws already provide clear requirements for those
seeking to enter into an enforceable contract.526 For example, statutes on surrogacy contracts set age limits, restrict who may enter into a binding surrogacy
agreement, and regulate the terms that such contracts must include.527 And in
family law more broadly, states set limits governing marital agreements.528
There is no reason that states could not encourage similarly responsible contracting around the idea of embryo disposition.
What might such a model law look like? Perhaps the closest analogy is
to prenuptial agreements. Just as couples enter into embryo disposition agreements before beginning IVF, couples sign prenuptial agreements before a
marriage begins.529 In both contexts, people may suffer from optimism bias,
underestimating the chances of conflict down the line.530 And just as those

523. See, e.g., Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos but I Get the House (and the Business):
Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1159, 1210 (2009).
524. See, e.g., id. at 1225.
525. Id. at 1224; c.f. Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce, and Family Law Contracting: A Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 422 (2013).
526. See infra note 527–528 and accompanying text.
527. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1806 (2019); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 47/25 (LexisNexis 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2019); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 742.15 (LexisNexis 2019).
528. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36g (2019); NH REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:2-a (2019); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-3-501 (2019).
529. See Prenuptial Agreements: Who Needs It and How Do I Make One?, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/prenuptial-agreements-overview-29569.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2019).
530. Forman, supra note 525, at 421; Ian Smith, The Law and Economics of Marriage Contracts,
17 J. ECON. SURVS. 208 (2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=416650 (describing the significance of optimism bias in the entry to premarital agreements).
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soon to be wed may not adequately protect their interests, most couples beginning IVF will not bargain at arms’ length.531 Although states take considerably different approaches to regulating prenuptial agreements, and although
prenuptial and embryo-disposition agreements differ in salient ways, the Uniform Premarital Agreements Act (UPAA) may provide a helpful starting
point.532
The UPAA has both procedural and substantive requirements.533 Procedurally, the UPAA requires that an agreement be voluntary, that both parties
have had the chance to consult independent legal counsel or clearly waived
their rights, and that both parties had a full disclosure of the assets and liabilities of the other.534 Substantively, the UPAA allows courts to require additional support payments to avoid making one partner eligible for public assistance.535 Courts also have the power to refuse enforcement of an agreement
that is unconscionable at the time of signing or if substantial hardship would
arise because of a material change in circumstances following the signing of
the agreement.536
In the embryo-disposition context, it makes sense to require that couples
have access to independent counsel and the financial means of obtaining it.
In a legal field with many complex, unsettled questions, those beginning IVF
could use legal guidance and help understanding how to protect themselves.537
Few embryo disposition agreements may be involuntary, and financial disclosure may be less relevant in the IVF context because disputes tend to involve
the achievement or avoidance of genetic parenthood rather than financial matters. However, a model statute should address the financial consequences of
bringing a pregnancy to term, especially in cases in which one of the parties
no longer intends to play a role in a child’s life.
What about substantive requirements? States could consider limiting the
enforcement of embryo disposition agreements under circumstances that

531. Cf. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (Wash. 1972) (making this point in the context of prenuptial agreements).
532. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).
533. See id. § 9.
534. See id.
535. See id.
536. See id.
537. See Anna El-Zein, Embry-Uh-Oh: An Alternative Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 82
MO. L. REV. 881, 901–04 (2017) (discussing a requirement of independent counsel before a cryopreservation agreement is presumed to be enforceable).
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might seem unconscionable, allowing lawmakers and voters to weigh in on
what would make unwanted genetic parenthood untenable.538 Regardless of
the details of such a statute, putting in place requirements for such a contract
would encourage contracting parties to take embryo disposition decisions
more seriously and to enter into agreements that better reflect their intentions.
What about the balancing required in abortion law? There are reasons for
preserving some form of balancing analysis in the abortion context: Casey
recognized that abortion cases involve both a constitutionally protected liberty
and an important governmental interest in fetal life.539 Nevertheless, the Court
can still clarify dimensions of a balancing analysis to eliminate some of the
confusion in the lower courts.
First, if a law severely burdens abortion access, as was the case in Whole
Woman’s Health, courts should invalidate it, even if the government can show
that it has some benefit.540 After all, Casey recognized that the government
has an important interest throughout pregnancy in protecting fetal life.541 Attaching too much importance to the benefit created by an abortion law could
undermine the careful balance struck by Casey and encourage courts to uphold
most (if not all abortion regulations).542
If laws create a minimal burden but have little benefit, what approach
should the Court take? Here, voting-rights jurisprudence provides a helpful
analogy. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court applies a balancing
test established in Anderson v. Celebrezze.543 To determine whether a law
unduly burdens the right to vote,
a court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh
“the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff

538. C.f. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT, supra note 532 (noting a similar
power of invalidating a contract on the grounds of unconscionability for premarital agreements).
539. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
540. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016) (“The rule announced
in Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together
with the benefits those laws confer . . . [and] consider whether any burden imposed on abortion access
is ‘undue.’”).
541. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
542. Id. at 876 (“The very notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the
conclusion that not all regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens on the right to decide
whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue.”).
543. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
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seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into
consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary
to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”544
The Court has insisted that even the most modest burdens require proof that
the government addresses a real problem.545 “However slight that burden may
appear,” the Court recently explained, “it must be justified by relevant and
legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’”546 If
a law impacts a constitutionally protected liberty, the government should
show that it advances some concrete goal.547 Both in the context of voting and
abortion, the Court must strike a balance between important governmental
concerns and constitutionally significant liberties. To do so, the state should
show that a law delivers some benefit.
The Court should also clarify that Casey’s balancing requires consideration of the impact of an entire statutory scheme on a woman’s access to abortion rather than the effect of an isolated regulation.548 Casey and Whole
Woman’s Health clarify that the real-world effect of abortion regulations matters, and women’s ability to access abortion will depend on all the laws that a
state implements.549 Taking an entire statutory scheme into account may also
help to illuminate the purpose of a law, providing evidence of where a law fits
into a broader legislative agenda.
What about the definition of the large-fraction test? The Court should
establish that the undue-burden standard does not require the kind of numerical precision demanded by the Eighth Circuit in Jegley.550 Again, consider a
comparison to voting rights.551 In Anderson, the Court addressed an Ohio law
that required presidential candidates to meet a March filing deadline for those
seeking to appear on the ballot in November.552 Those challenging the law
544. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
545. See Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008).
546. Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992)).
547. Id.
548. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–17 (2016); see Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
549. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2292; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
550. Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. V. Jegley, 864 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 2017).
551. See generally Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (challenging an early filing deadline for Presidential candidates).
552. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782–83.
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argued that it would unduly burden the right of independent-minded voters
who would more likely favor a candidate emerging later in a race, perhaps in
response to a specific issue or event.553 The Court found that the early filing
deadline unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote without specifying a
number of independent-minded voters who would be impacted by the restriction.554 Indeed, to the extent that the Court described the size of the affected population, Anderson expressed particular concern about laws that
harmed a small but well-defined group with “a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.”555 At times, parties in voting rights
cases have put a number on the burden created by a law,556 but the Justices
have never imposed such a requirement.
Nor should the Court require a specific number in the abortion context.
Just as in voting-rights case, many abortion regulations will often impact a
specific, if sometimes small, group, such as domestic violence victims, poorer
women, or those living in relatively isolated areas.557 Before a law goes into
effect, it may be impossible to identify a specific number of affected women.
And even after a law is implemented, those challenging an abortion regulation
may have insurmountable obstacles in proving that those who have lost access
to abortion can trace their problem to a law rather than to other issues, such as
the market for abortion care or personal financial issues. As Whole Woman’s
Health suggested, a law that eliminates abortion access for some women creates constitutional problems even if many in a state would be unaffected.
Although the nature of men’s reproductive rights remains unclear, the
compromise struck in the late 1980s cast a long shadow on the law affecting
both ART and abortion. The Court should more carefully consider whether
to apply a balancing approach when dealing with reproductive rights and
should more carefully tailor any such test it applies.
V. CONCLUSION
In legal history and constitutional law, reproductive rights have become
synonymous with women. Largely missing has been the history of the law

553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
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governing reproductive rights for men. In some way, this gap makes sense:
the Court has generally identified gender-neutral reproductive rights (such as
those involving contraception or sterilization) or rejected the claims of men
when they conflict with women.
But recovering the history of men’s reproductive rights illuminates how
the law governing both ART and abortion took its current shape. Abortion
foes seeking reproductive rights for men urged the Court to look at the parties’
individual circumstances in determining who should have the final say about
procreation. Abortion-rights supporters generally responded that gestation
alone should break any tie between men and women in abortion cases. The
Court settled on a compromise between the two: treating gestation as dispositive in abortion cases but otherwise making individual circumstances paramount.
By focusing so much on gestation, we have lost sight of the distinctions
between ART and abortion law—and of other considerations that should matter in defining a person’s reproductive rights. When gestation cannot determine the outcome of reproductive disputes, we have more reason to worry
about individualized balancing approaches than we might have expected. Too
often, courts applying both rules risk turning reproductive decision-making
into a meritocracy, awarding rights to those who convince a judge that their
view of childbearing and child-rearing is the most deserving. As the history
of debates about men and reproduction suggests, we deserve better.
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